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The l iberalization of our immigration laws in the United States 
appeared to be a priority on the polit ical agenda while President 
George W.  B ush weighed proposals to expand access to visas,1 until 
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terrorist attacks placed these plans on hold.:- Democrats in Congress 
urged even broader l iberal ization than that contemplated by the B ush 
administration.-' Support from both labor unions and business 
interests may make l iberalizing reforms pol itically feasible in the near  
future . .) as  the B ush administration has resumed negotiations with 
Mexico on immigration pol icy with the support of D emocrats in 
Congress." This retreat from the overwhelmingly restrictionist politics 
of recent years has been a welcome development as considerations of 
not only national  economic welfare b ut a lso social j ustice m ilitate in 
favor of l iberalized access for a l iens seeking employment in the 
United States.  
After a lL our immigration restrictions are a form of govern ment 
mandated employment d iscrimination against aliens . Our  immigra­
tion statute prohibits the h iring of aliens not authorized to work in the 
United States and imposes sanctions on employers violating this 
prohibition.11 Aliens are authorized to work here ,  for the most part, 
only if they have a '·green card , "  that is, are legal immigrants , or are 
temporary workers with nonimmigrant visas.7  Our immigration laws 
not only impose quantitative restrictions on the number of these visas 
issued but a lso impose require ments for access to those visas that no 
native would h ave to meet in order to work in the United States.x 
Even if our laws d id  not include an explicit ban on the h iring of 
unauthorized immigrants, the threat of enforcement of o ur immigra-
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tion laws, through the exclusion and deportation of aliens. would 
prevent or curtai l  a l ien access to employment opportunities in  our 
labor markets. Thus, our immigration laws are a substantial  barrier 
to the free flow of al ien labor into the U n ited S tates. 
For example, we require "labor certification" for most categories 
of employment-based immigration visas, including those for ski l led 
workers, even workers holding advanced degrees.<) Labor certifica­
tion requires, among other things, that  the employer show that · 'there 
are not sufficient workers who are able, willing, qua lified . . .  and 
available" to perform the work in question.111 By "qualified ," our 
immigration laws generally mean minimally qualified . 1 1 Thus. our 
laws mandate that  employers choose any minimally qual i fied U . S .  
worker over any better qualified a l ien . 12 Through our immigration 
laws, we deny alie ns access to valuable employment  opportunities 
that are open to natives. At a fundamental level, these laws are at 
odds with antid iscrimination principles we take for granted in  other 
contextsY 
This government mandated employment d iscrimination is espe­
cially striking given the basis for the d iscrimination.  Most aliens are 
born aliens because our n ationality laws deem them to be a l iens 
based on immutable characteristics, including the geographic locat ion 
of their birth and the cit izenship of their  parents at the t ime of the ir 
b irth . 1-1 For a liberal  society that declares that "a l l  men are created 
equal,"15 this d iscrimination,  based explicitly on circumstances of 
lJ.  !d.�� 1 1 :'3( h)(2)-(3) . 1 1 K2( a )(5)( 0 ) . 
10. !d. �  llK2(a)( 5)(A)(i ). 
ll. The sta tute requires the U .S. worker  to he "equal l y  qual i fied . . o n l y  111 the case of an 
a l ien who .. is  a membe r of the teachi ng profess ion 
. . o r  " has except iona l a b i l i ty i n  the sciences or  
the a rts ... M s 1182(a)(5)( A)(ii). 
12 .  See STEPHEN H. LEGOiv!SKY. liv!iv!!GRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY IS) (2d 
cd. llJlJ7) ( .. [T]he employ e r  ord i nar i ly  m ust hire a m i n i m a l l y  qual i fied American over a more 
qual i f ied a l i e n  (or hire no one at a l l )  .
. . ). 
1 3. See 42 U .S .C . � 2000c-2 ( 2000). 
l. :J.. See U.S.  CONST. amend.  XIV. s I ("Al l persons horn . . .  in the Un i ted States. anJ 
subject to the jurisdict ion thereof. are c i t izens of the U nited States ...... ): S U . S . C .  � 140 I ( 2000) 
(sett ing forth categories of "ci t izens of the Un i ted States at b i rth 
. . ). 
15. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para.  2 (U.S .  1776). As the foc us ol this arti cle 
IS an eva l uat ion o f  U . S .  immigrat ion pol ic ies. my ana lys is  examines  the tension bet\1.een these 
pol ic ies and the ideals  of  equa l i ty and neutrali ty  that we general ly  e spouse lfl the U n i ted St<Hes 
\Vi thin our l i beral  polit ical  philosophy. I do not address the question o f  whether other societies 
must also l ive by the same principles  to which we are committed. as that i ssue IS beyond the 
scope of this art ic le .  See J oseph H. Carens. !Yiigrcuion i/1/{l iv/omlity: A Lihcm! Eguliwriun 
Perspective. in fREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSLES IN THE TRA;-.iS\!r\TI0'-1.-\L l'viiCiR.ATION OF 
PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 25. 36-40 ( B rian  B a rry & Robert E. Goodi n eds .. llJl):Z) [he rei nafter 
C/1/CACO-KLNT LAW RCVIDV [Vol 7K:2\)l 
birth,  is at odds with ideal  principles of social j ustice.1h Our liberal 
ide als raise a presumption in  favor of equal  treatment and p lace the 
burden on those who defend discrimination to come forward with a 
j ustification for discriminatory laws. 
The discrimination based on n ativity in  our national i ty laws 
would be less important if it  were a simple matter for an a l ien to gain 
permanent residence in the United States and then natural ize .  Once 
an al ien immigrates and gains lawful permanent residence , the alien 
becomes a U . S .  worker  with access to the U .S .  labor market and 
eventually access to U.S.  cit izenship. 17 Our immigration laws,  how­
ever, raise significant barriers to immigration and thereby deny the 
vast  majority of al iens access to the employment opportunit ies 
provided to U . S. natives as  a b irthright .  Insofar as these hurdles 
prevent most al iens who desire such access from enjoying the oppor­
tunities open to U.S .  natives,  they discriminate against those who are 
born aliens in favor of those n atives. The more restrictive our immi­
gration and naturalization policies. the more significance they confer  
on nationality at  birth,  and  the more our  l aws discriminate based on 
circumstances of birth.  
In Part I of this Artic le ,  I examine our immigration restrictions in  
l ight of our liberal ideals of equality.  I argue that these ideals  require 
us to extend equal concern to all individuals and that this cosmopoli­
tan perspective makes it  difficult  to j ustify our immigrat ion restric­
tions.  This vio lation of the principle of equal  concern represents one 
sense in which immigration restrictions violate our l iberal  idea ls .  
I n  Part IL I assume a less  demanding moral theory,  which a l lows 
us to give the interests of n atives priority over the interests of a l iens .  
I argue that even from this parochial perspective , it  is difficult to 
j ustify the employment d iscrimination implied by our i mmigration 
restrictions as ideal policies unless we count the sati sfaction of 
segregationist preferences as a justification.  The role of intolerance 
in explaining the adoption of immigration restrictions underscores the 
second sense in which the employment discrimination impl ied by our 
immigration policies violates our l iberal  ideals .  
FREE iV!OVEMENTj (asking vvhether other countries are obliged t o  have the same immigration 
policies as the United States). 
16. See Howard F. Chang. lnunigmrion Poficv, Li/Jerul PrincijiiC.I, und r!Je Rc;J/rhlicun 
Trudirion. :)) G EO. L.J. 210:1. 2 1 1 2- 1 5  (l \)()7 ). 
1 7. See ::\ U . S . C .  � l-127(a) (20!Hl) (providing for naturalization or permanent resident 
aliens). 
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In Part I I I ,  I explore the normative implications of my analysis 
for the reform of our immigration policies .  I conclude that it is 
difficult for us to j usti fy employment d iscrimination against aliens 
from a l iberal perspective, whether we adopt the cosmopolitan 
perspective or a less egalitarian p erspective that al lows us to  favor the 
interests of n atives over those of aliens.  The interests of natives, 
however, may j ustify some restrictions on alien access to public 
benefits and to citizenship, which would suggest l iberalized guest­
worker programs as a component of immigration reform . These 
programs would not be ideal from the cosmopolitan l iberal perspec­
tive, but then neither would our current immigration restrict ions.  I 
argue that guest-worker programs would represent a non-ideal ,  
second-best improvement over the status quo from a cosmopolitan 
perspective , given constraints that make more ideal policies polit ical ly 
infeasible .  Finally, in Part IV, I offer some concluding remarks .  
I .  THE LIBERAL IDEAL AND THE COSMOPOLITAN PERSPECTIVE 
Consider the liberal theory of j ustice developed by John Rawls. 
who asks what principles people would choose behind a "vei l  of 
ignorance . "IK In this " original posit ion," people know nothing about 
their own personal circumstances or traits and thus "do not know how 
the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they 
are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of  ge neral 
considerations.  "IY This condition ensures that the parties are "fairly 
situated and treated e qually as moral persons, "211 or as Ronald 
D workin describes, extends ' 'equal concern and respect"  to each 
indi vid ual.:? 1  
Using Rawls' theory, Joseph Carens addresses the issue of immi­
gration restrictions as a question of social j ustice . 22 In seeking a 
j ustification for the exclusion of a liens, "we don' t  want to be b iased 
by self- interested or partisan considerations'' and instead "can take it 
as a b asic presupposition that we should treat all  human beings. not 
j ust members of our own society, as free and equal moral persons. "2� 
10. Sec J OH\i RAWLS. A TH EORY OF JUSTICE 130--12 ( 1 Y7l ) .  
19. /d. at 1 36-37: see id. at l-11 ('"If a knowkclge of particulars is allowed. then the uutcomc 
is biased by arbitrary contingencies ... ) . 
20. /d. at 141. 
21. ROi':.-'\LD DWORKI"J. T AKI\iG RIGHTS SERIOLJSL Y 180-81 ( 1977) 
22. See Joseph H. Carens. Aliens and Ci1i::.ens: The Case ./(Jr Open Borders . ...f\) REV. POL. 
251 . 255 (1Yo7 ). 
23. /d. at 256. 
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Carens identifies this premise as a basic feature of al l  l iberal  pol itical 
theories .2-l concluding that we should "take a global ,  not a n ational ,  � � 
view of the original position .  "2=' 
If  we begin with equal  concern for a l l  persons .  then  immigration 
barriers are morally suspect and demand j ustification .  A l l  immigra­
tion restrictions discriminate against individuals based on their 
alienage. which in turn derives from immutable characteristics such as 
birthpl ace (that is .  national  origin) and other  circumstances of birth 
such as parentage.211 National origin would appear to b e  a trait that 
Rawls should deem "arbitrary from a moral point of view."27 Carens 
concludes that we cannot j ustify restrictions ''on the grounds that 
those born in a given territory or born of parents who were citizens 
were more entitled to the benefits of citizenship than those born 
elsewhere or of al ien parents. ' '2�' Nor can we j ustify restrictions "on 
the grounds that immigration would reduce the economic well-being 
of current citizens. "2l) Simi larly,  in a utilitarian calculatio n  of global  
we lfare , ·'current citizens would enjoy no privileged position .  "111 
A. Immigration Restrictions and Global Economic Welfare 
Suppose we adopt the perspective of a global  utilitarian and thus 
give equal weight to the we l fare of e ach individual in the world .  Can 
we then j ustify the employment d iscrimination mandated by our 
immigration laws? Perhaps this unequal treatment for a l iens is 
somehow consistent with equal  concern for the interests of each 
individ uaP1 An economic analysis of the welfare effects of immigra-
2-4. See id. at 26:1 (claiming that ··our social i nstitutions and public policies must respect all 
human beings as moral  persons.·· which .. entails recognition . . of the freedom and equality or 
every human being 
.
. ) : see ul1 u id. at 26'1 ("No moral argument will seem acceptable . . . i f  i t  
directly cha l lenges the: assumption of the equal moral worth of all individuals .
.. ). 
25. /d. at 256. 
26. Set' Roger Nett. T!te Cil'i! Rig/11 \Ve Are No! H.eud1· For: The H.ig/11 of Free Movmrenl of 
l'r:uplr: on 1/rr: Fuce ofillr: Eunfz. Sl ETH ICS 212.224 (llJ7l) ( 
.. May we expect the lesson which 
the Negro has taught h1s iellow Americans about denial o f  fair opportunities to be repeated on a 
broader scale. with the underprivileged of the earth de manding ·desegregat i on· of nation 
states·-' 
.. ) .  
27. RAWLS. Sllf!rll note IS. at 72. 
20. Carcns. supr{{ note 22. at 26l. 
2'1. ld at 262. 
31J. /d. at :?.63 ( .. [T ]he utilitar ian commitment to moral equality is reflected in the 
�tssumption that everyone ts to count for one and no one for more than one when utility is 
calculated . .. ). 
31 . As Dworki n e:xpi<1ins ... the r i ght to lrealnlml as an eifllal" does not necessarily i m p l y  a 
··right to i'ifl{(t/rrcurnlenr'' in the allocation of a particular opportunity. DWORK!l'i. supra note 
21.at227. 
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t ion restrictions, however, indicates that  these barriers to labor 
migration not only reduce global wealth but also i ncrease inequality 
in  its d istribution worldwide.  These barriers are neither economical ly 
efficient nor equitable .  
Consider the economic e ffects of labor migration in world labor 
markets .  We would expect labor to migrate from low-wage countries 
to high-wage countries in pursuit of higher wages. As a result of this 
migration,  world output rises .  Higher wages in the host country imply 
that  the marginal product of labor is h igher there than in  the source 
country. That is ,  higher wages for the same worker mean that  the 
worker produces more value in  the host country than in  the source 
country. Labor migration generally leads to net  gains in wealth for 
the world as a whole , because labor flows to the country where i t  has 
the higher value use .12 An efficient global labor market would allow 
labor to move freely to the coun try where i t  earns the highest return . 
Market forces would thus direct labor to the market where i ts  mar­
ginal  product is highest .  For this reason, economic theory raises a 
presumption in favor of the fre e  movement of labor. 
Immigration barriers interfere with the free flow of labor inter­
nationally and thereby cause wage rates for the same class of labor to 
diverge widely among different countries .'' For any given class of  
labor, residents of h igh-wage countries could gain by employing more 
immigrant labor,  and residents of low-wage countries could gain by 
sel l ing more of their  labor to employers in high-wage countri es .  
I mmigration restrictions distort  the global  labor market ,  producing a 
misallocation of labor among countri es ,  thereby wasting human 
resources and creating unnecessary poverty in l abor-abundant 
countries.  
The larger the inequality in  wages between countries.  the large r 
the distortion of global labor markets caused by migration restric­
tions, and the l arger the economic gains from l iberalizing labor 
migration. Given the large international differences in wages. i t  
should b e  apparent that  t h e  potentia l  gains from liberal ized l abor 
migration (and the costs that the world bears as a result of immigra­
t ion barriers) are huge . In fact . some economists have attempted to 
32. See PAUL R. KRUG:YIAN & MAURICE 0GSTFELD. INTERNATIONAL EC00i0\IICS: 
THEORY AND POLICY JSr;-Sl) (2cl ed. )l)l) l ) .  
33. See !'v!exictul Depurrees Rcpurr Goud Trcunncnr. UP! . April  2 1 .  l lJlJo. ul·uiluh!c or 
LEXIS. Nexis Library. UP! File (reporting that Mexican immigrants received an ;;veragc or 
$278 pe r week in the U nited S tate s.  compared with $30.Kl per week in Mexico). 
29K CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 78:291 
estimate the gains that the world could enjoy by l iberalizing m igra­
tion. These studies suggest  that the gains to the world economy from 
removing immigration barriers could well  be  enormous and greatly 
exceed the gains from removing trade barriers . For example, Bob 
H amilton and John Whalley provide a range of estimates based on 
various assumptions about crit ical parameters, but a l l  of their esti­
mates suggest that the potential  gains are large .J-l Many of their 
estimates suggest that the gains from free migration of labor would 
more than double worldwide real income .35 Even their most conserva­
tive estimate suggests that the gains would b e  a s ignificant fraction 
(more than 13  percent) of worldwide real income .3ti Furthermore , 
their analysis i nd icates that the free  migrat ion  of labor would also 
greatly improve the globa l  distribution of income by raising real  
wages dramatically for the world's poorest workers.-'7 
Given these welfare effects, the employment discrimination i m­
plied by immigration restrictions are difficult to  defen d  i n  terms of 
the cosmopolitan l iberal idea l .  This ideal  would extend the principle 
of equal concern expressed by Rawls' original position to al l  persons.  
Carens and others conclude from these l iberal premises that "we have 
an obligation to open our borders much more ful ly  than we do  now. "3s 
B. Justice and the Alien 
Some theorists have questioned the application of Rawls '  origi­
nal position to the international context. R awls himself assumes that 
the '·boundaries" of his principles " are given by the notion of a self­
conta i ned national community. "3l) James Woodward argues in favor 
of applying Rawls' framework to inhabitants of a particular country 
rather than globally .-�11 Simi larly , Stephen Perry notes that the scope 
of the origina l  position i s  limited to persons within a single society, 
_14. See Bob Hamilton & John Whalley. Efficiency and Distrihurional fmpficarions of 
Gluhul Resrricrions on La hour !'vlohifirv. 14 J. D EV. ECON. o 1 ( 1984 ). 
35. See id. at 70. 
3o. Seeid.at7l-72. 
37. Seeid.at 73-74. 
3K. Carcns. supm note 22. at 270. Carens condemns immigration restrictions: "Like feudal 
barriers to mobility. they protect unjust privilegt:." /d. Similarly. Bruce Ackerman concludes 
that immigration barriers are inconsistent with liberal principles: - - r cannot justify my power to 
e:-.:clude you without destroying mv own claim to membership in an ideal liberal state." BRUCE 
;\. ACKER\!Ai\. SOCIAL JUSTICE II" THE LiBERAL STATE 93 (1980). 
39. RAWLS. supra note 18. at 457. 
40. James Woodward. Conzmemarr: Uheralisnz and !VIigrarion. in FREE MOVEMENT. supra 
note l:'i. at 59.75: said. at 75-81. 
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which Rawls defines as "' a cooperative venture for mutual  advan­
tage . '"-!] Citing Rawls' defini tion, Perry argues that ·' [t]he original 
position is not appropriately employed [to create a s i tuation in which] 
the parties al l  live in different countries or societies and do not know 
which one is theirs .  "-12 
The first problem with Perry's argument is that i t  raises the ques­
tion of whether a world in which countries engage in international 
trade in goods,  services, capi ta l ,  and labor is a "cooperative ven ture 
for mutual advantage.··-�_, If so ,  then the world is a "society" in which 
all individuals would be parties to the origina l  position.-�-� U nder this 
theory, by choosing to cooperate ,  we take on obligations of j ustice 
toward one another.  
There is .  however, a deeper problem inherent in  m aking obl iga­
tions of j ustice contingent on voluntary acts of cooperation.  This 
approach al lows us to avoid obligations of j ustice by refusing to 
cooperate with d isfavored groups.  I f  we impose a boycott or embargo 
against al iens, then we owe them no explanation in terms of j ustice . 
This approach reconci les discrimination against al iens with egaiitarian 
principles of social j ustice only by fiat: i t  assumes the result rather 
than deriving itY 
We cannot begin our normative analysis by assuming that we do 
not cooperate with al iens .  As the example of immigration policy 
demonstrates. the question of which individuals we choose as partners 
in cooperation is itself an open question of public policy that  we may 
want to answer using our principles of j ustice . I f  we make obligations 
of j ustice contingent on whether we cooperate in  the first pl ace,  then 
this normative framework becomes a function of our policies and 
cannot work as an independent standard that  we can use to evaluate 
these po licies .  Our analysis becomes circular: we are j ustified in 
discriminating against al iens i n  employment  precisely because our 
-11. Stephen R. Perry. !111111igruiion . .lu.\lice, ond Culrure. in  JUSTICE IN i:'v!i\IIGRATIO� LJ4. 
107 (Warren F. Schwartz eel.. Jl)l),'i) (quoting RAWLS. supm not<:: lK. at 4). 
-12. !d. 
-1} See CHARLES BEITZ. POLITIC\L THEORY A'lD [NTERNATIOC-iAL RELATIONS l43-.'i3 
( Jl)7':J) (arguing that sufficient cooperation and interaction exists among nations to justify a 
global vie\\' or the original position). 
-1-1. SeC' Thomas M. Scanlon. Jr . . Rmd1' Tlieorr ofJu.lrice. 121 U. PA. L. REV. 1020. I06n-o7 
( llJ73) (arguing that .. considerations of justice applv at least wherever there is systematic 
economic interaction 
.. and therefore Rmvls' principles of justice . . apply to the world economic 
system taken as a wh ole"). 
-l.'i. Thus. critics or this approilch complilin that 1t is "an arbitrary move which cannot b..: 
defended within the theory." BRIAN BARRY. THE LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE 12LJ ( ll)73). 
Cff!CAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 7i-1:2l)l 
refusal to hire them relieves us of obl igations of  j ustice.  Such a t heory 
begs the question of whether our choice of p artners is i tse lf j usti fi ­
able . �() 
Only the global interpretation of the origina l  posit ion offers a 
satisfactory framework for the evaluation of our immigrat ion pol icies 
under a liberal egal itarian theory of j ustice .  This cosmopoli tan 
perspective is the only interpretat ion of the original  posit ion that  is 
faithfu l  to "the underlying spirit of R awls' theory ,"  which "is ani­
mated by the underlying idea of eliminating or compensating for 
·morally arbitrary' differences between people .  "47 Cosmopolitan 
l iberals note that ''the fact that  one is an  inhabitan t  of one p articular 
country rather than an other . . .  i s  a paradigmatic example of the sort 
of 'morally arbitrary' fact that  the method of the original  posit ion is  
designed to abstract from. "�� To restrict the scope of our theory of 
j ustice based on such morally arbitrary facts undermines our c la im to 
a l iberal egalitarian theory of j ustice . 
Nevertheless.  Woodward seeks to j ustify this  restrict ion on  the 
origi nal  position by pointing to "rea l  world facts about peopl e ' s  actual 
motivation and non-ideal  behaviour. "�<) He notes that "very extensive 
immigration rights . . . are not rights that  people i n  affluent countries 
would be motivated to act in  accordance with or to respect ,  once they 
take up their p laces in  such societies" and concludes that 
·· [r]ecognizing this, the parties  to a global contract would not agree to 
such rights. "')II These polit ical  real i t ies ,  Woodward argues ,  constrain 
the theory of  justice that emerges from the origina l  posit ion .  
Woodward ' s  appea l  to realism, however, confuses the ideal  and 
non-ideal  parts o f  a theory of j ustice.  R awls explains that  his  "main 
concern" is with the ideal  theory,  which " assumes strict compliance " 
and descr ibes '·a perfectly j ust  b asic structure" under "favorable 
circumstances. ":'! "Existing institutions are to be  judged in  light of 
-l-11. Thus. the fact that cooperation is feasible should be sufficient to require the inclusion 
or a prospecti\e partv to the original position. See Charles B eitz. Co.lmotJo!iwn ldeuls and 
.YI IIionu! St'nliill('/1{. :-\() J. PHIL. )l)l. 5l)5 ( ll)8:1) (arguing that otherwise. "limiting the scope or 
the principles to national 'ocieties on the grounds that international cooperation dncs not exist 
todav ... would mbitrarily favor the status quo"). 
-l-7. Woodward. '"l'ro note -!-0. at 80-81. !n this sense. Rawls' failure to cxtenu his 
principles globallv is .. �ln ud ll!n move . . . inconsistent with the underlying egalitarian spir it" of 
his thcorv. !d. at 76. 
-1-:--: /d. at 7o. 
-1-Y. !d. 
50. M 
51. R.�.WLS. supru note IS .  at 2-l-5. 
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this conception and held t o  be  unj ust t o  the extent that  they depart 
from it without sufficient reason.  "52 The non-ideal  theory ' ' is worked 
out after an ideal conception of j ustice has been chosen:  only then do 
the parties ask which principles to  adopt under less h appy condi­
t ions .  " 5 3  The non-ideal  theory takes account of "historical contingen­
cies" and ' ' inj ustice " in  existing social arrangements.  54 Thus, i f  we 
understand our proj ect as the formulat ion of an ideal theory, then the 
popularity of pol icies  deemed unj ust  under that theory i s  no reason to 
revise our theory to uphold those policies instead.  
If  we apply Woodward 's  approach to our ideal  theory of j ust ice ,  
then we make the theory vulnerable to capture by popular prej udice 
and undermine its capacity for a critical evaluation of the status quo . 
By taking actual non-ideal behavior as given, Woodward imparts a 
conservative bias to the origina l  posit ion.  Carrying this approach to 
i ts  logical conclusion, we would conclude that the part ies to the 
original position could only endorse existing arrangements .  Such an 
ideal  theory would fai l  to serve its function , which is to provide a 
standard by which to judge existing insti tut ions .  
Carens suggests that a · 'real ist ic" approach to moral ity in  
seventeenth-or eighteenth-century America "would perhaps have led 
one to articulate a moral i ty for slaveholders,  rather than cal l ing into 
question the institution o f  slavery and demanding its abolit ion.  " 5 '  He 
notes that "any moral  v iew o f  s lavery was flawed and inadequate i f  i t  
did not  start from the recognition that  slavery was fundamental ly ev i l  
and unj ust" and that  " [  a ]ny satisfactory moral view had to have 
abol i tion as i ts ultimate goal .  " '11 A realist account would be flawed 
and unsatisfactory in two possible senses. F irst, Carens may mean 
that  i t  vvould simply fai l  to describe moral tru th and therefore would 
be a false moral theory.  Second ,  a real ist  account m ight be inade­
quate because it wou ld fa i l  to advance the cause of  j ustice over the 
long term. That i s ,  by legi t imating the status quo,  the real is t  wou l d  
fail  t o  promote m ore en l ightened att itudes and thus would s t a l l  
progress toward more j ust po l icies .57 In con tra st " [a]pproach ing 
52. !d. a t  24o. 
:'13. M at 245-4o. 
54. 1 d. at 24o. 
) ) .  Joseph H. Carens. Reu!isric unci ldeu!isric Approuches In ril l! Lrhics of /1!/igmri"n.  � ! I 
I NT . L  M I G R ATION R E V .  ! 5o .  1 64 ( l lJS!h ) 
5o. M a t l o5 .  
5 7 .  I n  t h e  i m m i grat ion c u n k x t .  Cu r e x a mple.  Louis i'vl icln e l  Sc: i d m a n  u rges u s  t o  C1 V(t i d  
furt h e r  � t r c ngthening t h e  h a ncl o f  those who w o u l d  defe n d  e x c l usion < m d  h o u n d e d  c: , r i n :; · 
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moral questions from an idealistic perspective avoids legit imating 
policies and practices that are morally wrong and gives the ful lest  
scope to our critical capacities . ' '-'� 
I f  we allow the real ist  perspective to displace our ideals ,  then we 
breed complacency regarding the morality of the status quo. Robert 
Goodin suggests that morality may sometimes require us to advocate 
" unrealistic" options: 
[I ] f the only reason the options are unrea list ic  is that  people are 
unwi l l ing to make sacrifices that they could and arguably s h o u l d  i n  
pursuit o f  m orally important goals,  t h e n  t hose options should b e  
very much o n  t h e  table.  The proper role of  polit ics ,  in such circum­
stances,  is precisely not to 'be real istic'  and acce p t  uncrit ical ly  peo­
ple's unwill ingness to make morally proper sacrifices. It  is ,  rather ,  
to persuade them that moral  ideals  are wort h pursuing.59 
I n  this sense , according to Carens , "ideal  theory holds u p  the princi­
ple of free  migration as an essential part of the j ust  social  order 
toward which we should strive .  ' 'r.o 
Woodward obj ects that  "as we abstract away from rea l  world 
facts . . .  the relevance of the ( ideal )  principles and institutions that 
would emerge from such an idealized original  position to what  \Ve 
should do in the actual non-ideal world . . .  becomes progressively l ess 
clear .  " r. 1  He asks what this ideal theory i mplies " about how nations 
should behave in  the actual world ,  which is very far from conforming 
to these ideal arrangements? "62 Woodward is right to ask what 
practical implications this ideal t heory has for our non-idea l  world 
even if he  is wrong to suggest that we should rej ect an ideal  theory 
because it is unrealistic .  What good are the prescriptions of ideal  
theory if there is no rea l  chance that we would actual ly adopt the 
prescribed policies? With Woodward 's  quest ion in mind ,  let us next 
turn to the perspective that he might consider more re levant from a 
realist perspective . 
Louis Michael Seidma n . Fl!ar ond Lourlling ur rill! Hurder. in J LSTICE IN l iv!ivi i Ci RATI ON .  supra 
n ote 41. at 1 40 : Sl!l! ill. at 1 4 1  ( cr iticizing arguments that " provide ammunition for defenders of 
c: x clusion and apologists for the status quo." ). 
58. Carcns. supru note 55 . at 1 67 .  
59. Robert E .  G ooJi n .  Conunenwrv: The Po!iricul Realism of Frl!l! !'v!o n:nzl!nl. in FREE  
tv!OV E!vi ENT. supru note 1 5 .  at 241-\ . 254. 
60. Ca re n s .  supra note 22. at 262. 
6 1. WooJwa rcl. supra note 40 . at 7 7 .  
6 2 .  /d. 
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Our immigration laws are usually j ustified based on an assump­
tion that we may privilege individuals born into those favored classes 
entitled to U .S .  citizenship upon birth under our nationality l aws.n3 
Thus , the discrimination explicit in our laws derives from an implicit 
assumption regarding the unequa l  status of persons based on  nativity. 
This assumption is one sense in which our immigration and national­
ity laws violate our ideals of equal  concern for al l  persons.  
There is  also a second sense,  however, in which these l aws violate 
our liberal ideals.  To i llustrate this point,  consider the fol lowing 
thought experiment. For the sake of argument ,  suppose we grant the 
premise that we are entit led to  favor the interests of natives over 
those we designate as aliens based on circumstances of birth . I adopt 
this nativist perspective strictly as a theoretica l exercise ,  not because I 
believe that our immigration pol icies should be  guided solely by the 
interests of natives, but because such concerns have in fact p layed a 
dominant role in the public debate over immigration policy and are 
commonly thought to provide the strongest case in favor of restrictive 
immigration laws. 
vVe might adopt this nativist perspective as a concession to  politi­
cal realities . ().) National governments,  including that of the United 
States ,  will  l ikely continue to deem the promotion of the interests of 
natives as the paramount obj ective of immigration policies . It may be  
politically infeasible to  ask  natives to  se t  aside their collective self­
interest in formulating our immigration laws.  This non-ideal feature 
of the real world may impose a constraint on the set of p olicy alterna­
tives open to us as a practical matter.  
Furthermore , many observers bel ieve that the pursuit of national 
self-interest is j ustified as a moral matter.  "Realists find i t  morally 
acceptable that we should prefer the interests of our own collective to 
63. See. e. g . .  S .  REP.  No.  lJi'\-62. a t  3 ( l lJ�3 ) ( " [T]he para m oun t obliga t ion of  any na t ion's 
gove rn m e n t. i n d e e d  the very reason fnr its e x i s tence and the j us t i ficat ion for i ts  power. is  to 
promote the national  i n t e re s t - the long-term we l fa re o f  the m aj ority of i ts c i t izens a n d  their  
desct: nd.:� n ts . . .  ) . 
n<-f.  As Seidman observes . the l i m i tat ions  1 m posed by "bounded caring fare] l i k e  i t  o r  
not .  . . .  facb t h a t  exist  i n  the world . .  a n d  " u n l i k e l y  to ch ange m ore t h a n  m a rg i n a l l y  i n  the n e a r  
fu ture .
. . so th at a n y  "rea l -world i m m igration p o l i c y  m ust . . .  t a k e  account o f  t hese facts and 
work around them .
.
. Sei dmil n . sur m n o te.: )7. a t  l -ID.  
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those of mankind in general . . . . " h� From this standpoint ,  an analysis 
of the effects of  immigration restrictions on the interests of natives is 
d irect ly relevant to the determination of the idea l  immigration policy. 
This perspective need not ignore the interests of a l iens e ntirely,  but 
may j ustify some discrimination against al iens by giving p riority to 
natives .  Perry, for example ,  argues that " [t ]here is . . .  an  upper l imit 
on the self-sacrifice that l iberal  states can demand of their citizens, 
and . . .  this l imit will  apply to the treatment of outsiders .  "611 Specifi­
cal ly.  he suggests that '' [ s ] tates may demand that . . .  imm igrants not 
be a burden on society,  and even that they be  capable o f  making a 
positive contribution . "67 
Can we just ify our immigration restrictions using this  criterion? 
In particular,  does the exclusion of a l iens mandated by our immigra­
tion laws actually promote the economic interests of n atives , as 
restrictionists claim? Does the promotion of the economic welfare of 
natives call for these immigration restrictions? The following analysis 
suggests that the answer to these questions, as they are normally 
understood. is no. We would deem our i mmigration restrictions to be 
ide al  pub lic  policies from the perspective of natives only if we  are 
prepared to count the satisfaction of segregationist preferences as 
elements of soc ia l  welfare . I t  is in this sense that immigrat ion restric­
t ions violate our l iberal ideals even if we assume arguendo that 
national welfare is appropriate as our policy obj ective . 
A .  Effects of Immigration in the Labor Market 
I f  we examine the impact of immigrants in the labor market .  we 
fi nd that the natives of the host country, taken together ,  will  gain 
h) D a v i e!  C. H e n drickson.  ''viigmlion i n  ! . tn t· und L!ltics: A Reulisl Pcrsp cuh c .  i n  FREE 
\,] ( 1\ T !\ I E\T.  S / /fi/"!1 no te l :'i . Ci t 2 1.3 .  2 1 -J.- l :'i :  I ('C id. al n:; c · [T]he collec t ive we l l -be ing o f  our 
own st < • tc· .  <1 nd or th�· i nd i v i d u a l s  who compose i t .  ought  to have a grea t e r  we igh t in our mora l 
< lccuu n t • ng th cm thc '.\ e l l-being o f  tbusl� o u ts ide t h e  commun i ty . . . ) . 
1>6 . PL·rrv.  supru note ..J. J . at 1 0"\ .  
tJ7. !d. <�t l l l lJ. Thus.  Pe rry does not suggest  t ha t  we seek to max im ize the b e n e fi ts derived 
tw nati ves from i m m i gran ts .  Natives could extract the maximum be n e fi t  from imm igra n ts by 
imposi ng a La r i !t on them a n d  t h e reby rais i n g  e .\ t ra t a \  revenue from i m m igra n ts. See Howard 
F.  Chang. / _ iiwmli::.ct! !u unigrution 11.1 Fr<'c [rude: Econumic 'v\ld.fi1re 111 111  rlze Op timal fll lmigru-
1ion P1 •/ic ; . l -t:' U. P A .  L R E V .  ! l ..J.7 . J 1 :'\7-05 ( llJlJ7 ) ( ana lyz i ng the op t ima l t ari ff on immi ­
grant> .  ctss u ming tha t n a t i v e s  s c e k  t o  maxim i ze the i r  own economic w e l fa re ) .  The criterion 
Pcrrv suggests  would n o t  go so fa r as to  demand the maximum contr ibut ion fro m a n  i mmigrant :  
t l <; u n l •: "sks  t h a t  t h e  contri b u t i o n  be pos i t i v e: .  
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from the immigrat ion of la bor. h·' 'vVages may fa ll for nat ive  workers 
who compete with immigrant labor,  but th is  loss for workers is a pure 
transfer among natives :  i t  is  o ffse t  by an equal gain for those who 
employ labor,  and ultimately for consumers, who obtain goods and 
services at lower cost . h'� Furthermore , natives gain from emp loying 
immigrant workers: they gain surplus in excess of what they pay 
immigrants for their labor. 71 1  If they did not gain any surplus from 
employing immigrants, they would not hire them. Thus,  nat ives as a 
group enj oy a net  gain . 7 1  Labor migration represents a form of 
international trade in which the source country exports labor to the 
host country. 72 Like international trade in  goods. labor m igration 
a llows foreign suppliers to sell their services to domestic buyers, 
allowing both parties to e nj oy gains from trade as a result of  the 
transact ion.  
1 .  Effects o n  Native \Yorkers: Empirical Evidence 
We may be concerned ,  of course , with the distr ibut ion of incom e 
among natives.  Immigration not only expands wealth ,  but also can 
have important d istributive effects.  Those natives who must compete 
with immigrants in  the labor market may find that immigration 
reduces their real income .7' Thus,  countries often  restrict immigrat ion 
to protect n ative workers from the unemployment  or the wage 
reductions that the entry of fore ign workers would supposedly e n tai l .  
Studies of the effects of immigration in  U.S .  labor markets, how­
ever, have shown l itt le evidence of effects on native wages or em-
68. 51'1' N AT I O N A L  RES E A RCH C O U N C I L .  T H E  N EW A :> I E R I C-\NS:  ECON O \ ! I C. 
D E M OG RA PH I C. AND FISCAL E FFECTS O F [ f<. L \I I Ci R ATION 1 3 5-:53 ( J ames  p_ S m i t h  & B arrv 
Edmonston eds . . I <Jl)T ) [hereina fter N R C ] .  
6l)_ 51'1' id. at  1 30-39. 
7()_ 51'1' id. 
7 1 .  G eorge B orj as has attempted a rough ca lcu la t ion of the  size of t h e  sur p l u s  c n j ovcd b\ 
nat ives in the U nited States as a result  of immigrat ion using a varie tv of assumptions .  Sl'l' 
Ge o rge J _ Borj as. Tlze Economic Bmeflts fi·om Immigration . J .  E CON . P E R S P  . . Spring l lJ95. at 3 .  
5 .  Assuming a homogeneous supply o f  labor. for example.  Bor jas es t imates  tha t  imm igrati o n  
in to  t h e  Uni ted  States has  produced a surplus of $7  b i l l ion per  year .  See id. at 7 .  Bor jas  
describes th i s  amount  as "re la t ive ly  s m a l l" compared t o  the s ize o f  the  U . S .  economy.  !d. As 
the N RC notes. however. t h i s  benef i t  " remains a s ignificant  pos i t ive  gain i n  absolute  terms" and 
re mains  l arge compared to t h e  economic e ffects o f  most  other  publ ic  pol ic ies :  " Not manv 
c ha nges i n  pol ic ies  would produce benefi t s  a s  l arge as that  number . . . N RC. sup ra note 68.  at  
1 5 3 .  Furthe rmore . i f  these bene fits seem too smal l . then we can enjoy  larger gains by taking i n  
m o r e  imm igrants a n d  therebv incre a s i ng the imm igra t i on surplus .  
72.  See H oward F .  Chang. Migmtion us !n rerrwtionu! Tr{{ (/1': The Ecun on zic Guins fi·0 1 1 1  tfze 
L ihem!i::ed !VIo venzent of Lahor. 3 U C L A  J .  l NT'L L.  & FO R E I G N  AFF. 37 1 ( llJlJK-lJLJ ) .  
7 3 .  Sl'e N RC. supm note 6 ::-> .  a t  1 3 0-40. 
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ployment _i-1 A survey of this empirical l i terature indicates that 
immigration h as a weak effect on the employment of n ativesY 
Furthermore, the evidence indicates a weak relat ionship between 
n ative wages and immigration across al l  types of nat ive workers, 
white or b lack, skilled or unskil led .7h 
Why do i mmigrants have so l itt le adverse impact on  the wages 
and employment of natives?  One reason is that the demand for labor 
does not  remain fixed when immigrants enter the economy. I mmi­
grant workers not only supply labor.  for example,  they also demand 
goods and services, and th is demand wil l  translate into greater 
demand for locally supplied labor.  This increase in  demand can offset 
the effect of increased supply.  
Furthermore, the empirical e vidence indicates that immigrants 
and natives are not perfec t  substitutes in  the labor market . 77 Thus, 
immigrants often  do not compete for the same j obs  as n atives.  
Indeed,  immigrant labor can be a complement  rather than a substi­
tute for native labor, so that an incre ase in  the supply of immigrant 
labor will increase the demand for native labor and thus h ave posit ive 
effects on native workers rather than negative effects .  I n  fact ,  labor 
markets are highly segregated,  with immigrant labor concentrated in 
some occupations while natives are concentrated in others . 7�' 
I f  only immigrant workers take certain j obs,  then n atives can 
gain from immigration in these markets without any adverse effect on 
the wages of native workers. IVIoreover. if native workers  can move 
into jobs where their competit ive advantage ( in English language 
skil ls ,  for example) provides a natural barrier to competit ion from 
immigrants, then they can enj oy the benefits of immigration and still  
avoid any adverse effects of immigration in the labor market .  Thus, 
segmented labor markets imply that immigration can produce gains 
for n at ives in the labor market without necessarily producing adverse 
effects for native workers .  
74. See id. 
75.  See, e.g . . George J .  B orj as. The Econonz ics o fln z l l l igrulion. 32  J .  ECOC\. LIT.  1 667 . 1 690 
( 1 994) :  Rachel  M .  Friedberg & jennifer H unt .  I/ze lnzpucr uf lnznzigrwzrs on f!o.\1 Coun rrv 
Wages, Enzploymenr and Grmvlh . J. ECON.  PERSP . . Spring J 9LJ5 .  at 23. 42: N R C .  supm n ote 68. 
at 2 2 3 .  
7 6 .  See, e .g  . . G e orge J .  B orj as. suprn no te 7 5 .  a t  1 6Y7 :  Friedberg & Hun t . supm note 7 5 .  a t  
42:  N RC. supra note 68. at 2 2 3 .  
77.  See Jean B aldwin G rossman. Th e  5iuhsriw whilirl' nf Narives and lmnzigronrs in 
Produclion . 64 R E V .  ECON . & STAT. 596 ( 1 982 ) .  
78. See NRC. supru note 68. a t  2 1 8 . 
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It i s  i mportant to interpret claims in  the l i terature in light of the 
empirical evidence of segmented labor markets .  For example ,  
George B orj as,  Richard Freeman, and Lawrence Katz  produce one of  
the largest estimates of the effect of immigrants on  n ative wages . 7� 
They estimate that immigration between 1980 and 1 995 accounted for 
44 percent of the 1 1  percent decline in the relative wages of high 
school dropouts in the United States during this period.Ko Those who 
advocate restrictive immigra tion policies have seized upon this  study 
to support their claims of adverse effects on unskil led native workers, 
and its conclusions have therefore been wide ly cited by restrict i onists 
in current  debates over immigration reform.x 1  Yet at  most, the study 
suggests that immigration restrict ions benefit the shrinking minority 
of native workers with l ess than a h igh school education.K2 
More important, this study uses a questionable methodology. 
B orj as,  Freeman, and Katz derive their  estimates from a simulation 
that assumes that unski l led immigrants are perfect substitutes for 
unskil led natives.K� That is ,  this simulation makes an e xtreme assump­
tion regarding the single most important fact in dispute .  The refore,  
simulations based on this assumption are b iased i n  favor of finding 
large effects on natives, and thus at best provide only an upper bound 
on the potentia l  effect of i mmigration on the wages of unski l led 
natives . K� 
7'-J. See G e orge J .  Borjas  c t  a l . .  How !VIucfl Do lnunigrurion und Tmde A f.f'ecr Luhor i\4urker 
Ourcume.1 ? .  in B RO O K I NGS P A P E RS ECON . A CTIV ITY. No . I .  at I ( W i l l i a m  C. Bradland & 
Ge orge C. Perry eds . . l <.J<.J7 ) .  
SO. See id. at 53. 62 .  
S l .  Th e  restr ict ionist  Center  for  I m migration Studies  ( .. C I S  . .  ) .  for example . c i tes  t his  study 
111 i ts  own paper cri t i c iz ing immigra t ion from Mexico. See STEVEN A .  CAtvi A ROTA. 
I M iVI J G RATION FROM M E X I CO :  ASSESSINCi T H E  I M PACT O N  THE U N ITED STATES 22 (20(l l )  
( c i ting the est imates b y  Borj as .  Freeman. and K;:�tz to support his  conclusion t h a t  . .  imm igra t ion 
had a significant  adverse impact  on the wages o f  nat ives without  a h igh  school educat ion") .  I n  
t urn . the  media  widely reported the conclusions o r  th i s  CIS paper.  See. e.g . .  Joe Cant lupe . 
Cuesf- H;orker Program Culled Misguided. S A N  D I ECiO U "' I ON -T R I B  . . J ul y  1 3 .  20(J l .  a t  A l 6: 
A l fredo Corchado. Srudie.1 Confliu 0 1 1  Bene/irs. Cos!.\ of Mexican Influx: Bor/1 Sides Press.1· Issue 
Befim? Fox, Congress Dehures. D ALLAS MO R N I NG N EWS. J uly 1 3 .  20!l l .  at l O A :  Jerry Kammer. 
Mexicun lmmigranrs Sup Ciri::ens, Reporr Su vs. A R IZ.  R E PU B L I C. Ju ly  1 3 . 200 1 .  a t  AS: Patrick J .  
McDonnel l . Dim View of Mexico Afigmrion: Srl lilv: Croup Backing Tighr Limil.\ S1n·s Influx 
Brings Huge Cosrs Bur Fnv Benefirs. L.A. T l i\. I E S .  Ju ly  1 3 . 2001 . pt .  2. a t  l .  
S2. See N RC. supra note 68. a t  228 (not ing t h a t  . .  [b Jy  1 <.J<.J5 . h i gh school dropouts repre­
sented less than  10 pe rce n t  of  the American workforce · ·  and were ··a decl in ing group of 
American workers " ) .  
8 3 .  See B orj as e t  a l . . supra note 7'-J. a t  5 6 .  Thus. t h i s  a pproach · 'does n o t  tru ly est imate t h e  
actual  impact of  i mmigra tion o n  t h e  l a bor mark e t .  .. N RC. supm note 68 . a t  227. 
84.  See Friedberg & Hunt.  supra note 75. at 3 '-J .  
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Furth ermore , Borj as ,  Freeman, and Katz simulate what  would 
have happened if we h ad cut off al l  immigration and al l  increases in 
trade flows since 1 980.�� We cannot infer from their  s tudy that  
immigration restrictions alone could have prevented the drop in 
wages that they identify ,  because they do not attempt to s imulate  that  
counterfactual . Given that immigration and international  trade are 
substitutes,  a decrease in  immigration would  probably cause an 
increase in trade flows, which would have a similarly depressing effect 
on the wages of unski l led natives.  This trade effect is a second reason 
that their  results overstate the actual effect  that immigration policies 
standing alone would have upon native wages. 
2.  Income D istr ibution and the Costs o f  Protect ionism 
Even if present levels  of immigration have l i t t le  effec t  o n  n ative 
wages in the United States ,  a more l iberal  immigration p ol icy m ight 
produce more significant effects .  Indeed ,  much of the support for 
current immigration restrictions is protectionist  in  n ature . Restric­
t ionists often cite the need to protect U .S .  workers fro m  immigrant 
competit ion in  the labor market_Kh 
Li ke  trade barriers, however, immigration barriers sacrifice  gains 
from trade and thus reduce the total wealth of natives as a group.x7 I n  
th is  sense , protectionism is  a costly way t o  redistribute weal th  from 
some natives to others. It is l ikely that we could redistribute this 
same wealth through t ax policies and transfer  programs rather than 
through protectionism and thereby make al l  classes of n atives better 
off,  because l iberalized immigration produces net  gains for n atives as 
a group. Thus,  concern for the distribution of i ncome among n atives 
does not imply that restrictive immigration laws are in order .  
First ,  concerns regarding income inequality do not  j us t ify any re­
s trictions on skil led immigration,  because skil led immigrants  not only 
increase total wealth for natives but also promote a more e quitable 
d istribution of income among nat ives.  They are l ikely to h ave an 
adve rse effect  only on competing ski l led natives and increase the real  
wages of everyone e lse ,  including less ski l led natives,  who e nj oy the 
ben efits of a greater supply of ski l led labor.  Therefore, the pursuit  of 
a more equal distribution of income would at most j ust ify concerns 
�5. .'lee Borjas et a l . .  supru note 7Y. at 6 1 .  
06. Sr!c, e.g . . George J .  Borj as. H EAVENS D O O R :  1 \- l i\ I I G R .-\TION POLICY A N D  T H E  
A. \ I E R ! C.-\N ECONO'v!Y ( l l)l)9 ) .  
'cl7. See N RC. supra note 6 0 .  a t  1 35-53.  
2003 ] !Mki!CRA TION A ND TI-n WOI<KI'LA CL .) ( ll) 
regarding unski l led immigration,  which could have an adverse e ffect 
on real wages of unski l led native workers.  
Second, even with respect to unskil led immigration.  the appro­
priate response to these d istributive concerns i s  redistribution 
through progressive reforms of tax and transfer policies.  not immigra­
tion restrictions .  If we wish to protect unskil led nat ive workers from 
adverse distributive effects,  redistribution is  l ikely to be a less costly 
solution than protectionism. If so ,  then optimal policies would 
l iberalize immigration insofar as i t  increases the total  wealth of 
natives. As long as immigration increases total wealth ,  then those 
who gain from immigration can compensate those who lose and s t i ll 
be better off. That i s ,  those who gain by paying lower wages,  or by 
buying products and services at  lower cost . can a fford to pay enough 
to compensate those who fin d  their wages fal l  re lat ive to prices .  
Through redistribution,  we can attempt to shift the costs o f  l iberalized 
immigration to the beneficiaries of l iberal ization.  
This redistribution would produce some costly d istortions,  but 
the deadweight loss of protectionism would presumably be grea ter  
than the deadweight loss from taxes  with the same effect on the 
overall  distribut ion of  income. That i s ,  protect ionism is presump­
tively less efficient than the tax system in  producing a desirable 
d istribution of income, because protectionism not only produces the 
d istortions associated with redistribution,  but also sacrifices the gains 
from immigration in  the labor marker .sx For example,  if the immigra-
00. L o u i s  K a p l o w  and S t e v e n  Shav e l l  suggest  that  we c a n  a l way s replace a n  cconomic: i l l \· 
ine ffic ient  rule with an e ffic ient  rule without  m a k i n g  a n y  income cl ass worse o il prov ided t h <l l 
we m a k e  t h e  appropria t e  adj ustments i n  income taxes.  See Louis  Karlow & Steven Shave ! ! .  
Why rite L eguf Svsrem is L ess Etflcienr rhan rhe Income Tux in Rfrli.1 1rifwring !nconw 2 3  J .  
L ECi f\ L  STU D .  667. 669 ( 1 994 ) :  Steven Shave l l .  A Nore o n  Efficien c \· 1 1. Disrrifw rionuf ErJuiry in 
L .eguf R u lenzaking: Sh ould D isrribu rional Equ ity fV!arrer Civt'/ 1  Oprin w/ !n wme Tuxurion( 7 1  
A M .  ECON. R EV . P APERS & PROC. 4 1 4  ( 1 98 1 ) . They a rgue t h a t  . . u s i ng l e g a l  rules to redistr ib­
ute i ncome d istorts work incentives ful l y  as m uc h  as the income tax syste m - because the 
distortion i s  caused by t h e  redistr ibution i tsel f - and also creates i ne ffi c i e ncies in the act iv i t ies  
regulated by t h e  l e g a l  rul e s  . .
. 
Kaplow & Shave ! ! .  supra . a t  667-68. Crit ics  have objected to th is  
"doub l e -d istort ion argument  
. .  
by point ing out  that  lega l  ru les  are not always less  cost ly than 
income taxes.  See, e.g . . Chris  W i l l i a m  Sanchi rico. D e consrrucring rhe Ne11 ·  Etficienn· Ruriono!t:. 
06 CORN E L L  L. REV.  1003. 1 008 (20Cl l ) . I t  seems fai r  to conclude.  howeve r. that  the cloubk­
d istort ion argum e n t  s t i l l  ra ises  a presumption i n  favor o f  taxes  rather  than i n e ffici e n t  legal  ru les .  
subject  to a possi b l e  rebutta l  i n  any particul a r  case  along the  l i n e s  suggested by these  cntics.  
The obj ections raised by these crit ics do not  i m p l y  that protect ionism is  supe rior to redistr i­
but ion t hrough taxes.  Chris Sanchirico.  for example.  notes  that  a double di stort i on may he l e ss 
cost l y  than a s ingle distort ion.  because " [d ] i s tortions m a y  counteract one another . "  !d. at 1 l l  1 7. 
There seems to be no reason to th ink .  however. that  the d istortions assoc i a t e d  with protect ion­
i s m  m i t i gate the distortions i n  work incentives associated with red i str ibut ion.  S i m i lar ly .  
Christ ine J o l l s  suggests that  legal  rules m ay achieve re distribu tion w i t h  less distortion in  \VOrk 
incent ives  if i nd i v id u a l  workers bear the cost i mposed by the legal  rule with only low proba b i l i ty 
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tion of unskil led workers reduces the wages of unskil led n at ives .  then 
raising taxes on those workers with higher incomes and reducing 
taxes on native workers with the lowest incomes could l eave all 
classes of natives better off than they would be in the absence of 
immigration.K� That is, those classes that would pay higher taxes to 
compensate unskil led n ative workers are l ikely to bear a still heavier 
burden under the protectionist  alternative , which raises the  prices of 
goods and services for a l l  consumers. That is ,  protectionist  policies 
currently impose an implicit  tax on these consumers that probably 
costs them more than the expl icit tax that would be necessary to 
compensate unskilled n ative workers for the effects of l iberalized 
immigration policies .  Once we recognize that protect ionism i s  merely 
a disguised tax-and-transfer program, i t  should be apparent that  there 
is  no good reason to favor protectionism over less cost ly and more 
efficient transfer policies .  
We could achieve redistribution more efficient ly and equitably 
by expanding programs already in  use under the exist ing U . S .  tax 
system. We could make Social Security t axes more p rogressive,  for 
example,  or we could increase the earned income tax credit  and 
l iberal ize its e ligibil ity requirements . �� �  These progressive reforms can 
ami are unduly opt imist ic .  See Christ ine J o l l s . Behuviumf Econ om ics A n u lvsis of Redisrrih u rivc 
Legal R ules. 5 1  YAND. L.  REV. 1 653 ( 1 991\) .  Insofar as protectionism u l t i m a t e l y  transfers 
wea l t h  thro ugh the same channel as  the i ncome tax. by changing the worker 's  a fter- tax income . 
.l o l l s ·  cr i t ique offers no de fense for protect ionism.  J o l l s  a lso suggests that  i f  workers treat  the  
cost  o f  a legal  rule as an expendi ture out o f  income ' " rather  than d i rect  charges  aga inst  i ncome .
.. 
th i s  mental  accounting may reduce d istortions in  work incentives .  !d. a t  1 670. Insofar as th i s  
c l a i m  is  true about  the costs o f  protect ionism. howeve r. a t  most  i t  would m i l i ta te  i n  favor of 
taxes on l uxury goods as our re distributive pol icy. not i n  favor o f  protect ionist  pol ic ies  that 
needlessly sacrif ice gains from i m m igrat ion in the l abor market .  
Fina l ly . Sanchirico a lso suggests that indiv iduals  may be hete rogeneous i n  ways that  make 
legal  ru les  superior to taxes.  Sanchir ico. supra. at 1 057-M: see Chris W i l l i a m  Sanch ir ico.  Taxes 
Versus Legul Rules us lnsrrunzcnrs .fC;r Lifuiry: A AI ore Equ irahfe View. 2 9  J .  L E C A L  ST UD . 797 
(2000 ).  This object ion might s ugge st a d e fense of imm igration restrictions 1 f  such po l ic ies 
happened to c hange the incomes. for example.  o f  t hose wi th  the least  elast ic  supp l y  of l abor. 
There is  no reason. however. to  t h i n k  that protecti o nism targets its tra nsfers in ways that reclucc 
d is tortions in  work incen tives. Nor i s  there any re ason to bel ieve that  prote ct ionism targe ts i ts  
tran s fe rs in  ways espec ia l ly  appe a l i n g  from the perspective o f  equity .  See infi·u note 9 1 .  
1\9. See Barry R .  Chiswick . /{{ega! lnunigrorion and !nunignuion Control . .J . ECON . PER S P  . .  
Summer 1 9SS. a t  1 0 1 . 1 0 7 .  
90. Thus. I d o  n o t  propose t h a t  w e  i de n t i fy workers displaced b y  i m m igrant  compet i t ion 
and target subsidies  to t hose i n d iv i d u a ls as we d i rect  " a d j ustment assistance .
. 
to  t hose harmed 
by i mport compe t i t ion.  See RAJ B H A LA.  INTERNATIONAL TRA D E LAW 1 5o(HiY ( 2d e d .  2000) 
(discussing trade adj ustme n t  ass istance programs ) :  J O H N  H. J."'.CKSON ET A L . .  L E G A L  
P R O B LE!VIS OF I NT E R NATIONAL ECONOM IC R E LATI ON S  660-65 ( 3 d  ed.  1 Sl9 5 )  ( s a m e ) . Trade 
adj ustment progra ms have proven " n ightmarishly complex"  a nd " i n e ffectu a l . . . B H A LA. supra. 
at  1 5 82.  Instead.  the meas ures proposed here would only  seek to e nsure that i m m igrat ion 
l ibera l izat ion does not  i n crease a fter-tax i ncome inequa l i ty .  
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supplement the income of  unskil led na tive workers if unskil led 
immigration drives down their real  wages. This alternative could 
reduce deadweight loss while sti l l  redistributing the same amount of 
wealth that we currently redistribute through costly protectionism. 
Evidence that immigration has only mild effects upon the wages of 
unski l led natives suggests that modest changes in the tax system may 
be sufficient to offset the distributive effects of l iberalized U . S .  
immigration policies .  
These measures would not seek to compensate precisely every 
single individual affected adversely by l iberalization so that immigra­
tion reform would m ake l i teral ly no one worse off. To insist that 
these reforms effect a Pareto improvement over the status quo is to  
set  too high a hurdle for reform. Such a requirement would prevent 
us from implementing virtually any reform in any public policy .  
Not only i s  it infe asible as a practical matter to replicate exactly 
the redistribution produced by protectionism, it i s  also not desirable 
as a normative matter that we do so.  We can design progressive tax 
and transfer policies so that they redistribute income on the b asis of 
morally relevant criteria.  whereas the alternative of protectionism 
distributes its subsidy on a morally arbitrary basis .  Protect ionism 
subsidizes the unski l led native who happens to face immigrant 
competition in the labor m arket but not the similarly unskil led native 
who does not. In  this sense , protectionism is inferior to tax and 
transfer policies from the perspective of not only economic efficiency 
but also horizontal equity. '1 1  
B. Fiscal Effects of Immigration 
The presence of transfer  policies ,  however,  may r::use concerns 
about the effect of immigrants upon the public treasury. Much of the 
debate over the effects of immigration upon the welfare of natives has 
focused on the possibi lity of negative fiscal effects .Y2 Even if concerns 
about the fiscal costs of immigration were to j ustify restrictions on 
unskil led immigration, however,  these concerns would not j ustify any 
restrictions on the immigration of ski l led workers, who tend to have 
higher i ncomes and pay more in taxes than they cost in terms of 
public benefits .  The empirical evidence confirms that educated 
9 1 .  Thus .  protectionism de rives no j ustifica tion from the  fact that  the  transfers that  i t  
achieves do not  fal l  on precisely t h e  same individuals  as  redistributive transfers through t h e  tax 
system .  See supru note 88.  
92. See, e.g. . CAi'v!AROTA. supra note 8 1 .  a t  35-4 1 . 53-54: NRC. supru note 6S. at  254-362.  
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immigrants  wil l  on average h ave a net  positive effect  on n atives.  
taking into account their effects on the public treasury.')3 It  would be 
in the economic interests of U . S .  natives to admit ski l led workers 
without protectionist " labor certificat ion" requirements or quantita­
tive restrictions .  The U nited States should e l iminate or l iberal ize 
these restrict ions .  
1 .  Fiscal Policies as Less Restrictive Alternatives to Exclusion 
Even for unski l led immigrants. the optimal response to fiscal 
concerns would not be  e xclusion ,  but less restrictive a l ternatives 
designed to e l iminate the fiscal burden that these immigrants impose 
on natives.  That is ,  if some immigrants h ave a negative effect  on the 
public sector. the optimal response is  not quantitative or  other 
protectionist restrictions on immigration.  Rather ,  the  appropriate 
response is fiscal .  Restrictions on a li en  access to public benefits ,  for 
example.  can improve the fisca l  impact of immigration without 
excluding unskil led immigrants from the U . S .  labor force .  Exclusion 
is the more costly response for both natives and i mmigrants ,  because 
it excludes immigrants not only from our public benefits but also from 
our labor market and thereby sacrifices the gains from trade that  they 
and we would otherwise enj oy.  
The obj ective of reducing the burden that immigrants impose on 
nat ives through the public sector underlies restrictions on  the access 
LJ.1 . The N R C. f o r  e xa mp l e . found that  the average i m m igrant w i t h  m ore t h a n  a h igh school 
educat ion pays enough i n  ta xes to prod uce a net fiscal benefi t .  Sa N RC. supru note fi8. at  33-J. 
(Tabk 7.5 ) .  I n  fac t . unce the N RC economists ta ke the pos i t ive fiscal e ffect o f  the  i m m igrant "s 
d e sceml a n ts i n to account .  they find t h a t  the average im m igran t  with a h igh sch o o l  education 
produce s a net  s u r p l u s  of $5 1 .000. and the a ve rage immigrant with more than a h igh school 
educa t i o n  producc:s a n e t  surp l us o f  $ l 9i-\.OOO. Set' id.  ( re porting net  present  value o f  average 
fisca l i mpacts in l lJlJh d o l lars ) .  A l th ough these ligures ··cio not take into account i n direct fiscal 
e ffects o f  i m m igr<t nts arising from any consequences o f  i m migration for the e a rnings or 
e m ployment  o f  the e x ist ing l abor force . · ·  the NRC notes that labor market effects  on nat ive 
workers ·· a re l i ke ly  to he q u i te sm a ll and . . .  could even he posit ive . ·· !d. at 305. 
As l ong as the NRC c a lcu la ti ons . .  contain no fe edbacks through the ge n e r a l  economy. ·· 
h owever. · · t h e y  d o  not reflect diminishing re turns to i m m igrants as a resu l t  of t h e i r  hypotheti­
ca l l y  incrc: as 1ng numbers . · ·  !d. at 333.  An incremental  imm igrant m ight d rive clown the wages 
o f  prior imm igrants. for e xamp le . which would red uce the taxes paid by those pr ior  i m m igrants. 
Tak i ng this e ffec t  into acco unt .  however .  would not change our conclusion that sk i l led  
i m migra n ts confe r  a net  economic b e n e fit  on nat ives .  Any such  reduction i n  taxes p a i d  by 
i m m i grants would be o u t ,veighecl bv the bene fi t native s  e njoy i n  the labor m arket  b y  reducing 
the cost of immigrant labor.  A wage reduction o f  one dol lar .  for example . would r eprese n t  a 
ga i n to nat ives as employe rs or consumers. and the resul t ing l oss of tax reve n ue s  would o ffset 
o n l y  a fract ion of this  gain .  I f  a drop i n  wages of one dol lar  could reduce tax payments by more 
than one dol lar . then imm igrants would e n JOY a net b e n e fit  from wage reductions and would 
h ave alre ady demanded lower wage s in order to enj oy this fiscal be ne fit . 
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of al iens to various entit lement programs. Current  U . S .  laws. for 
example , generally exclude nonimmigrants,  including temporary 
workers, and unauthorized immigrants from a broad range of public 
benefits :  with only n arrow exceptions, these a l iens are ineligible for 
" any Federal public benefi t . "�� Current  l aw a lso includes restrictions 
on the access of other aliens, including even legal permanent resi­
dents, to federal  entitlement programs. l)5 
The N ational Research Council ( ' 'NRC")  estimates that by 
excluding immigrants from various means-tested benefits for their  
first five years in the United S tates,  welfare legis lat ion enacted in 
1 996 improves the total fiscal  impact of the average immigrant by 
$8 ,000 in  net present value in  1 996 dol lars.% Moreover .  if the new 
welfare law has the effects predicted by its  proponents.  then the 
positive net fiscal  impact of immigration wil l  increase st i l l  more : the 
new restrictions would not only reduce the transfers paid to individual 
immigrants but also discourage the immigration of low-income al iens 
and thereby raise the income of the average immigrant . 'n Thus.  the 
NRC's estimates of the fiscal impact of immigration l ikely understate 
the fisca l  benefi ts of future immigrants, given the legislation passed 
by Congress in 1 996. Therefore ,  l iberalized immigration is now even 
more l ikely to produce net economic benefits for natives .  
If  immigration l iberal ization is  coupled with expanded redistribu­
tion of income , however ,  then i t  may be necessary to exclude immi­
grants from these increased transfers .  Othe rwise . transfers to 
immigrants could dissipate the economic gains to natives. '�·' Thus. 
unskilled immigrants may have a net positive effect on the welfare o f  
natives only i f  w e  restrict their access t o  transfer  programs. 
2. Nonimmigrants and Access to Citizenship 
Although immigrants can gain ful l  access to public be nefits  upon 
naturalizat ion,  only al iens " admitted for permanent res idence .
. 
may 
naturalize as U . S .  c itizens . '�'! Aliens admitted on nonimmigrant visas 
only, including temporary workers.  are not admitted as permanent  
9.:1-. 1) U . S .  C .  � 1 6 1 1 { a )  ( 2 ()( )( ) ) . 
95. See id. � �  1 6 1 2- 1 6 1 3 .  
96. See N RC supru note 68. a t  339.  
07.  See 8 U . S . C. � 1 60 1  ( 2 ) ( 8 )  ( 200U ) ( st a t ing the ob_1ec t i \ •: uf ensuring t h a t  · · the  a v a i l <� b ! ! i t v  
of  publ ic  bendits not const i tute a n  ince n t ive for Immigra t ion to t h e  U r. i t<:'d S ta tes . .  ) .  
98. See Chang. sup ra note  o7.  at 12  UL  
99.  8 U . S . C .  � l 427( a) (2000 ) .  
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residents and are thus not e ligible for most public enti t lements and 
not e ligible  to naturalize . 1 un Therefore , even if  fiscal concerns j ustify 
restrictions on access to permanent residence for unskil le d  workers,  
these concerns cannot j ustify restrictions on their access to nonimmi­
grant visas .  A truly temporary worker,  for example, would remain in 
the United States only while employed and would then return home,  
imposing even l ess of a burden on the publ ic  treasury than a perma­
nent residen t . 1 1 1 1 The empirical evidence indicates that  i mmigrants are 
l ikely to make a positive contribution to  the public treasury through 
the taxes they p ay during their working years and impose a burden 
only if  they remain in the United States for their retirement  years and 
gain access to  public benefits .  I l l:' Thus, temporary workers admitted 
on nonimmigrant visas, even if unski l led ,  are l ikely to  have a net  
positive economic impact on natives,  and there is l i t t le  reason to  
restrict their entry. 
U nder current U . S .  law, unskil led worke rs may enter temp orarily 
on H-2A visas for agricultural workers or on H-2B visas for other 
workers , 1 1 13 but both visas are subj ect to l abor certification require­
ments and other protectionist restrictions. 1 1 14 For exampl e ,  H-2B visas 
are l imited to  66 ,000 per year, 1 1 15 and require workers to  come " tem­
porarily to the United States to perform . . .  temporary service or 
labor. " I IIfl This "double requirement of ' temporariness ' "  requires the 
H-2B alien not  only to enter temporarily but  also to fil l  a temporary 
j ob . 1 1 17 The l iberalization or el imination of these requirements could 
great ly increase use of these programs. 1 1 1s As long as we retain the 
requirement of employer sponsorship,  we can ensure that  these guest 
l llO. See LECi01viSK Y. sup ru note 1 2 . at l)l) (d is t inguish ing i m migrants from non imm igrants ) .  
1 0 1 .  See Alan 0 .  Sykes. The Welf{tre r·cunomics of lmnz igrarion L a w: A Tlzeorericul Survn 
J\'ilh W I  Analvsis of U. S. Polin· . in J UST I C E  IN l !VI M I G R A T I O N .  sup ra note 4 1 .  at 1 58 .  1 8Sl .  
1 0 2. See NRC. supra note oi). at 3 1 5  ( Figure 7 .Sl) .  
1 03 .  See 8 U .S .C.  � l l O l ( a ) (  l 5 ) ( H ) ( i i )  ( 2000) .  
1 0-+. Sec i d.  � 1 1 88 (a ) (  I ) : x C . F . R .  � 2 1 4. 2 (h ) ( o ) ( i v) ( 20() 1 ) .  
1 05 .  See 8 U .S .C . � l l X.:f (g ) ( l ) ( B )  ( 2000 ) .  
l l lo. !d. � l ! O I (a ) (  1 5 ) ( H ) ( i i ) ( b ) .  
1 07 .  THOMAS A L E X A i'\ D E R  A L E I N I KOFF E T  A L . .  l Mi\.I I (j RATIOi'\ A N D  C I T I Z E N S H I P: 
P ROCESS A N D  P O L ICY 3Sl5 ( 4th e el .  l l)l):--1 ) .  
1 08 .  Admiss ions under H-28 visas have remained below one-third of t h e  quota l im i t  i n  
recent vears. and admiss ions under H-2A v isas have been s im i lar .  See id. a t  3Sl3: see also id . a t  
3 Sl5 ( not ing that  the demand for H -2 8  visas "would b e  much higher but for the double 
· temporariness· requirement " ) :  Sykes. supra note 1 0 1 .  at l 8l) ( not ing that · 'because of the 
t ransaction costs of obta ining a v i sa coupled with the l im i ted cert i ficat ions for labor shortages i n  
the agricultural  sector. employers often find that  [ H-2A] visas are not worth the e ffort to 
procure " ) .  
2003] / i\1/iV//CRA TION A ND THE W(_/ R K PLA CE 3 1 5  
workers wil l  b e  gainfully employed and l ikely t o  confer a net eco­
nomic benefi t  on natives. 1 1 19 
The alternative to a l iberalized guest-worker program for many 
migrant workers is probably entry as an unauthorized immigran t.  I n  
fact ,  employment-based immigration of unskil led workers into the 
United States has largely taken the form of i l legal rather than legal 
immigration . 1 1 0 Given that unauthorized immigrants have little access 
to public entit lements for as long as their presence remains unauthor­
ized ,  they may make a positive contribution to public coffers under 
the fiscal pol icies currently applied to them. Without distinguishing 
between legal and i l legal imm igrants, the NRC found that once we 
take the p os i tive fiscal effect of the immigrant 's  descendants into 
account ,  an immigrant with less than a high school e ducation imposes 
a net fiscal cost of only $ 1 3 ,000 in net present value in  1 996 dollars . 1 1 1  
I f  the 1 996 welfare legislat ion excludes immigrants from seven 
specified means-tested benefits for only their first five years in the 
United States, then the total fiscal impact of the average immigrant 
would improve by $8,000. 1 1 2 These N R C  figures suggest that if an  
immigrant never has  access to  such benefits ,  a s  would b e  the  case for 
an unauthorized immigrant who never obtains legal status , then such 
an immigrant would probably h ave a positive fiscal impact even if the 
immigrant were unski l led .  
I f  unauthorized immigrants produce benefits for n atives through 
not only the labor market but also the public sector, then natives have 
little to gain by imposing sanctions on those who employ unauthor­
ized immigrants. The repeal  of these sanctions would promote the 
interests of both natives and unauthorized immigrants. Indeed.  not 
only has President Bush recently called for repeal , 1 1 3 but so has 
organized labor. in a dramatic reversal of its support for employer 
sanctions since lobbying for their enactment in 1 986 . 1 1 -l 
Instead .  legaliza t ion of unauthorized immigrants through a l iber­
alized guest-worker program would serve the interests of these 
I OLJ. St'e Chang. supru note 67.  at 1 1 � 1 -KJ . 
I I 0. Se<' i d. at I lLJ7 .  
l l l . See N RC. supra n o t e  6 l-; .  at  334. 
1 12. See �/. a t 33LJ.  
1 1 3. See Bi l l  Sammon. Bush Urges L eguli::ing A liens. WASH.  T i tviES.  Sept .  7 .  200 1 .  a t  A I .  
1 1 4. See Nancy Clcc land.  A fL - C/ 0  Cul/s f(Jr Amnesrv for l/legal U S. Workers. L.A.  Tt!'. IES .  
Fe h. 17 .  2001 ) .  a t  A l .  Lahor leaders c i ted the need to protect unauthorized immigrants from 
exploitat ion hy emplovers. See id. : Steven G reenhouse. Luhor Urges A ll l n esrr fiJr If/ega/ 
fmmigmnrs. N . Y .  T i \ I E S .  Feb.  1 7 . 2000. a t  A2il. 
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immigrants as well as the interests of n atives. The workers would 
gain from h aving a legal alternative to i l legal entry and l ife as an 
unauthorized immigrant ,  which leaves them vulnerable to deportat ion 
by the government and abuse by employers . Furthermore,  admission 
as a guest worker need not entai l  permanent status as an  al ien.  N R C  
estimates indicate that t h e  United States could allow even a n  un­
skilled immigrant  to naturalize without generating a net fiscal  burden 
if a sufficient period of al ienage without access to publ ic  b e ne fi ts  has 
passed .  In fact, as the Bush administration considers proposals to 
l iberalize our immigration policies ,  i t  is currently d iscussing an 
expanded guest-worker program that would eventually a l low al iens to 
adjust their status to permanent residence and ult imately n aturalize 
as citizens . 1 1 :i 
C. Intolerance 
So how can we j ustify our current restrictions o n  the e ntry of 
immigrant workers? It is difficult to see a principled j ustificat ion for 
imposing quotas or labor certification requirements upon their 
i mmigration. These protectionist barriers do not serve the economic 
interests of natives as a group. 
Perhaps immigration b arriers are a second-best response to the 
concerns of natives when the first-best response is pol i t ical ly i nfeasi­
b le . 1 1 h In  this appeal to realism, as Goodin notes, ' ' real ism serves as 
an excuse rather than as a j ustification ,"  and " appeal ing to that  
excuse imposes a further obligat ion , n amely, to make very certain 
that th e  constraints on doing better rea lly are immutable .  " 1 1 7 If  they 
are not ,  then our duty is to seek to  change those constraints so that 
vvha t  was previously considered polit ical ly infeasible becomes possi­
ble. "Focusing too tightly on second- and third-best options m akes us 
not look closely enough to see whether and how the first-best option 
might actually be pursued.  " 1 1 s 
The q uestion then becomes: why is the first-best poli cy less popu­
lar  than the more costly policy of immigration restrict ion?  Why are 
1 1 5. Sci' Marcus  Stern .  1Vnv lnunigrurion Plan Ruiscs Ne11· Issues: U S. - Mnican S1raregy 
r;ocs Hemnd il l l ! i lf'.\l i , Gue,r- H'orka Pmgra11 1 .  SA!\ D I EGO U N I ON-TR I B  . . Aug. 1 2 . 2001 . a t  
A I .  
i 1 6 . \-Voodw a rd m a k e s  i h i s  tvpc of  c la im.  Sef' Woodward.  supra note 40. at  SO ( " Restric­
uons on e n t n  _ i n  m y  a rg u m e n t .  have the status of non-idea l .  second-best solutions . .  _ 1 11 an 
impcri'ect world . - - ) .  
1 1 7 . Goocl in .  SUfHU note 5LJ .  a t  24LJ. 
1 1  X. !d. at 2 5 6 .  
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we so quick t o  b lame immigration for our problems and e ager to seize 
upon i mmigration restriction  as the appropriate response? For 
example ,  why do advocates for unski l led native workers lobby 
successful ly for immigration restrictions rather than for more redistri­
bution through the tax system? If opposition to redistribut ion makes 
expanded transfers polit ical ly infeasible ,  then why is  this opposition 
any less vocal or any less effective against immigration restrictions 
that achieve the same redistribution at  higher cost? I mmigration 
restrictions,  after alL do a worse job of serving the interests  of natives 
than more efficient transfer policies . ' ' L) 
We can find at least part of the explanation for the populari ty of 
immigration restrictions in the preferences of natives regarding the 
ethnic or racial composit ion of the U . S .  population and thus its labor 
force. Almost since their  inception, federal immigration restricti ons 
have reflected concerns regarding the race and ethnicity of immi­
grants . 1 21 1 Soon after Congress began to regulate immigration in 
1 875Y'  i t  enacted the Chinese Exclusion ActY2 only the first in a 
series of laws restricting the immigration of  Chinese laborers . 1 21 
Subsequent laws reflected anxiety regarding not only Asian immigra­
tion but also immigration from eastern and southern E urope .  In  
1 92 1 ,  Congress enacted the  first quantitative restrictions on immigra­
t ion,  creating a national origins quota system that skewed the a l loca­
tion of visas toward aliens from northern and western Europ e . 1 2� 
Given this history of racism and xenophobia,  it would be naive to 
assume that intolerance does not continue to provide pol i t ical support 
for immigration restrictions in general .  Indeed,  restrictionist authors 
l ike Peter B rimelow are quite explicit in their expressions of alarm 
regarding the racial complexion of the immigrant stream into the 
United States . 1 2" The U . S .  Supreme Court recognized the pervasive 
influence of xenophobia in  the formulation of our public policies in 
I l l). See supm note KK. 
1 20. Sec U.S .  COMr.f N  ON C i V I L  R I G H TS .  T H E  T A R N I S H E D  G O L D E N  D O O R :  C i V I L  R I G HTS 
I SS U E S  I N  I M M I G R ATION 7- 1 2  ( 1 l)K0)  ( rev iewing the h istory of discri m inat ion in U.S .  l l11mlgra­
t ion pol i c ie s ) .  
1 2 1 . See Act of Mar. 3 . 1 1-:75 . ch . l 4 1 . 1 0 Stat . 477. 
1 22 .  Act of May h.  1 002. ch. 1 20 . 22 Stat .  50 ( repea led l iJ-U ) .  
1 23. Sec, e. g . . Act of M a y  5 .  1 0l)2 .  c h .  ()0. 2 7  Stat .  2 5 :  Act o f  Oct.  1 .  1 000. c h .  10()4. 2 5  Stat .  
504: Act of July .5 .  1 004. ch .  220.  n Stat .  1 1 5 .  
1 24. Ac t  o f  May l l). l l)2 1 .  ch .  S .  � 2 ( a ) .  42  S t a t .  5 .  Congress modified  th i s  system in t he  
Immigrat ion Ac t  of l l)24. ch .  l l)D. � 1 1 ( a ) .  4.3  Stat .  1 53 .  1 5 l) ( repealed 1 %5 ) .  
1 25. Sec P ET E R  B R i i'vl E LOW. A L I EN N ATI ON:  COr.H v! ON S E N S E  ABOUT A i'v! E R I CA'S  
l tvt iv! I G RATION D I SA STER 50-7.3 ( 1 l)l).5 ) ( describing wh i te America as caugh t between the 
"pincers" of  H ispanic and Asian Immigrat ion ) .  
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Graham v. Richardson , when the Court declared that  · 'c lassifications 
b ased on a l ienage , l ike those based on  . . .  race , are i nherent ly sus-
t " I  ' 6  pee . -
D oes this explanation for the popularity of immigration restric­
tions provide a j ustification? We might seek to interpret the ' ' inter­
ests ' '  of natives broadly to  include the satisfaction of their preferences 
regarding the ethnic or racial composition of the U . S .  populat ion . 1 27 I t  
i s  t e ll ing. however, that  w e  normally rej ect  intolerant p references as 
j ustifications for employment discrimination. 1 2� A reliance on  prefer­
ences for the ethnic status quo to j ustify our immigration laws would 
underscore the second sense in which our immigration laws violate 
our l iberal  antidiscrimination principles .  
Restrictionists might respond that the ir preference is  ne i ther rac­
ist nor xenophobic, but simply a preference for associating with 
workers most like themselves .  Perhaps the restrictionist  s imply 
prefers to be surrounded by workers who share the same culture and 
the same values and fears becoming surrounded by those who seem 
fore ign and unfamil iar .  But can we dis tinguish this associational  
preference from intolerance - the desire not  to encounter those who 
are d ifferent? Would the desire of an e mployer or i ts  employees to  
maintain a white workplace , because they  prefer i t s  homogeneous 
culture or simply value the famil iar status quo, j ustify the excl usion of 
racial  minorities? 
1 26 . .:1- 03  U.S .  365. 372 ( l l)7 1 ) . Thc  author of  the Gmh{{m opinion would l a te r  exp la in  tha t  
··a l iens often have  been  the  v i c t ims  o f  i rrat ional  d iscrim inat ion" and " h istorica l l y  h ave been 
d i sabled by the pre judice of  the maj or i ty ." which led  · · the? Court to concl ude that  a l ienage 
c lass i ficat ions ·in themse l ves supply a re <lson to i nkr  ant ipathy '  . . .  and therefore demand c lose 
j ud ic ia l  scrutiny . "  Tol l  v. Moreno. 45S U.S .  l .  20-2 1 ( B lackmun. L concurr ing )  ( quot ing 
Personnel  Aclm ' r  v .  Feeney . .:1-42 U .S .  256. 272 ( l l)7l) ) ) .  The Cru!zwn Court struck down state 
l aws condit ioning access to welfare benefi ts on ei ther U.S .  c i t izenship or res idence in the  United 
States for a spec i fi ed  number of years .  Recogniz ing the  tens ion between the Cruhulll reasoning 
and federal  immigrat ion restrict ions .  however.  the  Court would later re fuse to apply the same 
scrut iny to federal l aws discri m ina t ing aga i ns t  a l iens .  Sr:c Mathews v .  D iaz . .:1-26 U . S .  n7. S l -S7 
( l l)76 ) .  
1 27. See Chang.  supru note 67. at 1 2 1 0-2 1 .  We might  count the sat i s fact ion of  these rac is t  or 
xenophobic preferences an e l ement  of the we l fare of  these nat ives .  If o ur  obj ec t ives include the 
regulat ion o f  the racia l  compie x iUn of the l abor force. then i mmigrat ion restr ict ions serve that 
object ive we l l  by excl uding most people of  color m the world from access to our labor market .  
I f  the excl usion of  foreigne1·s i s  i tse l f  our ob ject ive .  then a pol icy of exclusion v ie l cl s  a per fect  f i t  
w i th  that  object i ve .  From th is  pe rspect ive .  immigrat ion restrict ion would be a first-bes t  pol icy.  
not mere ly  a second-best pol icy.  
1 2S. Sr:e O WO R K I :'\ .  sup ru note 2 ! .  at 2.'4-:0S ( arguing that  a calculat ion of  socia l  we l fare 
should exclude in to lerant preferences if i t i s  to j ust i fy a publ ic pol icv ) :  H oward F.  Chang. A 
L ih r:m! Tht:UIT n( Sociul v\ielfit rr:: Fuimcss, Urilitv. und rlz c Puretu Princi;I!C.  l l ( )  Y A L E  L . J .  1 73 .  
l 7lJ-% (2000 ) (sam e ) .  
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I f  w e  would r ej ect such associational preferences as  a reason to  
exclude minorit ies from a single workplace , then  why should we 
accept them as a reason to exclude people from al l  the  workplaces in  
the entire country. where the  claim of  an  impact on  one 's persona l  
associat ional i nterests seems far more remote a n d  tenuous? E ven if  
we identify l egitimate associat ional i nterests that  do not  derive from 
intolerance , i t  seems difficult  to explain why we must protect these 
interests through employment d iscrimination mandated by the 
government on a nat ional  scale rather than through the less  restrictive 
alternative of voluntary employment d iscrimination . I f  we  consider 
these associational preferences to be legitimate, then why not simply 
a l low employers to discriminate on the basis of nat ional  origin rather 
than mandating such d iscrimination by law? 
Indeed,  our liberal ideals  impose principles of neutra lity on the 
state that do not apply to the individual .  Under this p o l it ical  t heory, a 
l iberal  state cannot j ustify discriminatory l aws by e ndorsing one 
particular conception of the good,  for example ,  by  favoring one 
particular rel igion, whereas individuals are left fre e  to pursue their  
own conceptions of the good using their own private resources . 1 2l) 
Thus. even if we consider individuals free  to d iscriminate within some 
private sphere based on ethnicity or cultural traits ,  these preferences 
cannot provide a j ustification within our l iberal  framework for 
d iscrimination imposed by the coercive powers of the s tate . 1 30 
I .29. Se!' A C K E R vi A N  . . \ l if!ril noie 3:-\.  at l l  ( s uggest ing tha t  in a l ibera l  state.  no one can 
j us t i fy a legal regime by cla im ing that  "h i s  conception of  the good i s  bet ter  t han  that  asserted by  
any  of h i s  fe l low cit izens" ) :  R A W LS . supra note I t\ .  a t  44S ( s uggest ing that  i n  ' ' a  well-ordered 
society . . . .  the plans of l ife of  indiv iduals  are d i fferent i n  the sense tha t  these p lans give 
prominence to d i ffe r•.:nt  aims. and persons are l e ft free to determine the i r  good" ) .  
1 30. See Carens. supm note .22 . at  2AS ( "When t h e  state acts i t  mus t  treat indiv iduals  
equa l ly . " ) .  Ackerman suggests that  t he only legi t imate reason for a l ibera l  state to restrict 
Immigration i s  to protect the l i bera l  state i t se l f. Sci' A C K E R'vi A N .  sup ra note 38. at 95 ("The 
only reason for restrict ing immigra t ion i s  to protect the ongoing process of  l ibera l  conversat ion 
i t se l f. " ) .  S imi larly.  Pe rry notes  that  the  admission of "a  large number o f  persons from groups 
espousing i l l i bera l  or unde mocratic principles . . .  might .  1 f  admi tted on a su ff ic iently large scal e .  
pose a real risk to  t he  existence ur character of  a l i beral democracy." Perry. supra note 4 1 .  at  
I l -l .  Th i s  observat ion.  however. fa i l s  to J USt i fy the restrict ions we c urrent ly  impose on  
i mmigrat ion. See id. ( " [ l ] t  would presuma bly t ake  a manyfold increase i n  t he  levels of  
imm igration to . . .  the  Un ited States or Canada be fore such a r i sk  cou ld  be regarded as anything 
more than a theoret ical  possib i l i ty . " ) .  Furt htermore . we reduce th is r isk i f  we admit  a l iens as 
guest-workers w i th restricted access to c i t izenship rather than as permanen t  res idents who wi l l  
u l t imatelv natura l ize and \'O k .  Wil l  Kyml icka .  on the other hand.  argues tha t  "some l imits on 
immigration can he j ust i fied i f  we recogn ize t h <1 t  l iberal  states exist .  not  on ly  to  protect standard 
rights and opportuni t ies of incl iv iclua ls .  but  a lso to pro tect people's cu l tura l  membership . "  W I L L  
K Y l\I LI C K A .  M U LT I C U L  TL. R.-\ L  CITIZE N S H I P  1 .25 ( l 99) ) .  For ins igh tfu l  cr i t iques of  t he  cul tural  
argument for the exclus ion uf  a i iens .  sec ] E ,c\ !\ H ..-\ \ I PTON. POLITICAL P H I LOSOPH Y  230�41) 
( I  997 ) :  Perry. SUJ!m nute -1 1 .  at l l l l�.2 l .  
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Instead, we are reluctant to satisfy these preferences explic itly 
through regulat ion by the state .  Indeed,  in  1 965 we abol ished the 
infamous nat ional  origins quota system because we recognized the 
i l legitimacy of preferences for particular ethnic groupsY' How then 
can the preservation of  the ethnic  or cultural status quo b e  any more 
acceptable as a reason for us to restrict immigrat ion general ly? 
Unless we consider the ethnic purity of our labor force to  be a public 
good. it is hard to rationalize the employment d iscriminat ion m an­
dated by  our immigration restrictions as  serving the  nat ional  i n terest .  
Thus.  this employment discrimination against al iens,  l ike the forms of 
d iscrimination tradit ionally considered invidi ous . not only denies the 
victims of discr imination equal concern but i s  also difficult  to  j ustify 
as an ideal  practice unless we appeal to i l l iberal  prefe rences .  To the 
extent  that these intolerant preferences help explain the  enduring 
popularity of i mmigration restrictions despite the costs of these 
polic ies ,  this explanation underscores the i l l iberal  nature of the 
d iscrimination produced by these restri ctions . 
Intolerant preferences,  however i l legit imate,  can impose real  
constraints on the feasibil ity of l iberal ized immigration pol ic ies .  j ust 
as the general se lf-interest of natives may impose such constraints .  
Nevertheless, we  might plausibly view these preferences as  more 
amenable to reform than the tendency of n atives to pursue their  own 
self- interest.  The evolution of att i tudes in  the United  S tates toward 
ethnic  groups once greeted with hostil ity offers hope that  more 
tolerant attitudes will  eventually prevail with respect to  those who 
currently dominate the immigrant flow. Perhaps the p rocess of 
immigration itself will promote acceptance of these newer waves of 
immi grants, much as integration ultimately brought more e nl ightened 
att i tudes regarding I rish , I tal ian,  and Jewish immigration. Indeed ,  
spurred in  part  by the  increasing polit ical influence of the  Hispanic 
imm igrant population in  the United States ,  current  discussions of 
immigration reform have raised hopes for more open pol ic ies  in the 
near future, further underscoring the feasibil ity of l iberalizat ionY2 
1 3 1 .  Sr:e U.S .  C O M M .N ON C I V I L  R I G HTS . supra note 1 20. at I I  ( .. The nat iona l  origins 
immigration quota svstem generated opposi t ion from the t ime of i ts incept ion.  condemned for 
i ts a t tempts to mainta in  the exist ing racia l  composi tion of the Un i ted States .
. . ) . 
1 32 .  See Mark Benjamin .  Parries in Comperirion ji1r flispanic \lore. U P ! .  Ju ly  24. 200 1 .  
,mtiluhle ur LEXIS .  News L ibrary. U P !  F i le :  Thomas B .  Edsa l l .  1\nmestv Proposal Is Huge 
Gum h lc fi 'r  Bush; Presidenr Could he Rell'ardul Wirlz l!i.IJ!III I ic \lore hur Risks A ngering G O P 's 
Consenmivr: Wing. W A S H .  POST. Ju ly 1 7 .  :Z()( J l .  a t  A 2 :  Eric Schmitt .  Open Door, Open 
Qu nrinns: This Wa \' Up . N.Y .  T I 'vi E S .  Ju ly 22 . 200 1 .  � 4. at I .  
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There may be other factors contributing to the popularity of im­
migration restrictions and standing in the way of reform. For exam­
ple ,  part of the problem m ay simply be the fai lure of the public to 
understand the costs of protectionism, which imposes an implicit tax 
on natives hidden as increases in the prices of goods and services .  
This failure to appreciate the  economic effects of  misguided policies. 
however, does not offer a justification for such policies .  If these 
popular misconceptions were immutable .  i t  could also impose con­
straints on the feasibi l i ty of l iberal ized immigration pol icies ,  j ust as 
the general self-interest of n atives may restrict the set of polit ically 
feasible  immigration policies .  I t  seems plausible,  however,  to assume 
that these misconceptions are more amenable to change through 
education than the constraints imposed by the self- interest of n atives.  
It is especial ly the role of scholars and educators not to take popular 
myths as given but instead to seek to promote a more enl ightened 
understanding of the effects of public policies .  
Ill .  POLITICAL FEAS I B ILITY AND S ECON D-B EST POLICIES 
So what  are  we to make of the foregoing analysis? What are the 
normative implications for immigration policy? Cosmopolitan liberal 
ideals generally condemn d iscrimination against al iens .  Even theories 
that al low us to privilege the  interests of natives over those of al iens 
cannot j ustify employment d iscrimination against a l iens as ideal  
pol icy, 1 -'-� unless we count the satisfaction of i l l iberal  p references as a 
reason to adopt immigration restrictions. 
Excluding the satisfaction of segregationist preferences from our 
notion of social welfare . the welfare of natives would at  most j ustify 
discrimination against unskil led al ien workers in fiscal  policies ,  such 
as restricted access to public  benefits ,  and in  terms of access to 
cit izenship.  There i s  l i tt le j ustification for employment  discrimination 
against al iens,  given the alternative of redistribution among natives 
through taxes and transfer programs. From the narrow perspective of 
the economic interests of n atives, temporary worker visas may be an 
optimal response to fiscal concerns regarding al ien access to public 
benefits .  Through guest-worker programs.  natives e njoy the benefits 
1 33 .  T h us .  Pre s i d e n t  B u s h  defends suggest ions  lor i m 1mgra tion re form w i t h  a focus on a 
l i be r a l ized labor marke t .  stat ing:  .. [Wjhe n we fi nd wi l l i ng employer a n d  wi l l ing e m p l o v e e .  we 
ought to match the two. We oug h t  to make i t  eas ier  for people who want to e m ploy some body . 
who are looking for workers. to be able  to h i r e  people who want  to work . · ·  E d w i n  C h e n  & 
J o n a th a n  Peterson. Buslz fiinrs ur Broader /\ n u u :.l£_1". L . A .  T ! \IES.  J ul y  2 7 .  201l l .  at A ! .  
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of unskilled al ien workers in the labor market but do not  bear the 
fiscal burden of providing the ful l  set  of public benefits that  t hese 
workers would enj oy if they were to gain access to permanent resi­
dence and ultimately citizenship.  
From the perspective of the interests of al iens.  or from the per­
spective of cosmopolitan l iberal principles of social  j ustice.  however.  
these guest-worker  programs are only second-best policies .  From 
these perspectives ,  the ideal  policy may be legal permanent residence .  
access to citizenship.  and access to a l l  public benefits . The 
se lf-interest of n atives . however .  is bound to impose constraints of  
political feasibility on the availability of  immigrant visas .  The empiri­
cal  evidence suggests that unski l led alien workers are l ike ly to  have a 
net  negative fiscal impact if granted ready access to permanent 
residence and ult imately citizenship.  As long as natives are l imited in 
their willingness to bear  these fiscal burdens .  they are l ikely to  restrict 
alien access to permanent residence. e i ther  through quantitative 
restrictions or through qualitative restrictions that establish demand­
ing criteria for e ligibility . 1 �4 These constraints are like ly to exclude 
many unskil led  aliens from the U . S .  labor market unless they either 
are wil l ing to immigrate i l legally or have access to guest-worker  visas .  
1 34. See Ronald  B rownstein. Residencv a/ Core of lnunigrunl D e/J({{e; !'olicv: D i:,p ure is 
L ikely 10 Focus on !he Numher of Undocumen lfil Workers in U. S. A llmved iu SL·ek Pern wnenr 
Swrus. L . A .  T I M E S . J u l y  29. 20(l l .  a t  A I .  Cono:•.:: rvative Republicans l ike Senator Phil  G ramm 
adamantly oppose any access to permanent re side nce for guest workers .  G ra m m  has  said t h a t  
any s u c h  program w o u l d  h a v e  to p a s s  .. o v e r  my c o l d .  de ad po l i t ica l  b o d y  . .. M i c h e l l e  M i t te ls tadt . 
Senators Call /(!/· Giving Residencv ro ln zm igrunrs: Bush Weighs L eguli::: ution ldeu !'us/z ed h r  
Fox. D A LLAS MORN I N G  N EW S .  J u l y  l lJ . 200 1 .  a t  ! A . Some obse rvers have described guest­
worker programs as  .. more pol i t ica l l y  viable . . wi thout access to permanent reside nce . Jonathan 
Peterson . Anznestv 's the Road Bump i n  Dehute on fnz m igmrion . L . A .  T I �I ES . A ug. LJ. 200 1 .  a t  
A l .  The Bush administrat ion h a s  sh i fted i ts energies toward a program for te mporary workers.  
which i t  regards as "more acceptable pol i t i ca l ly  .
.. 
Jonathan Pete rson . fn zmigmtion Emplw.1i.1 on 
Guest Visas. L .A.  T i M ES . Aug. I S .  200 1 .  a t  A I .  
In a recen t  G a l l u p  polL 67 % o f  respondents rej e cted easier access t o  U . S. c i t izenship 
for  unauthorized immigrants. whi le  only  2 S 'Yc, supported this  proposa l .  See S teve S a i l e r. 
Anulvsis: Wh v Bush Blundered on ln unigrunts. U P  I .  Sept .  I 0. 2 !H l  l .  u •·u iluhle ur L E X  I S. Ne\\ S  
L ibrary . U P I  Fi le .  Recognizing t h e  pol i t ica l  controversy generated by proposa ls  to grant access 
to cit izenship. Mexico has a lso emph asized a n  <::xpancled guest-worker program i n  its negotia­
tions with the Bush admi nistrat ion and has been care fu l  not to press the  issue of  c i t izenship.  Bv 
mainta in ing flex i b i l ity  on t h is issue . Mexico se eks.  as  the  Mexican for e ign min ister  J orge 
Castaneda puts i t . "as many rights as possible . for as many iV! exicans ( in the U n i ted States ) as  
possibl e .  as soon as  poss ib le"  within the constraints o f  pol i t ica l  fe as ib i l i ty .  Robe rt  Co l l ie r. 
iv/()171 f'l111 1111 Grows to L egali:ze Mig rams: Collapse of Conzpmn z i1 c  Deal on Bill ;\ dds Pressure on 
Bush. Congress. l'v/exico 's Fox. S.F .  CHRON . .  July  16.  20(l l .  a t  A I .  As one Mexi can negot iator 
expla ined . . . we . . .  have to be very real ist ic .
.
. A l fredo Corchado. Fox Puslzn len· 11 !Wore Open 
Border; Cull fin Freer Migration Stops Shorr of Reijllesr fi >r A n z n cst v.  D A LLAS M O R t\ I NG N EW S .  
J u l y  16 .  200 1 .  a t  l A. Castaneda has explai ned that  access to cit izenship " i s  not  something of  
huge signi ficance to us . · ·  Sergio M un oz. Jorge Caslwzedu: i'vtexico '_\ J'vlan ;\ hroud. L.A.  T I 0- I ES .  
Aug. 1 2 . 200 1 .  at M3.  
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Given such polit ical  constraints on access to permanent resi­
dence, guest-worker programs may represent the only al ternative to 
i l legal immigration for aliens otherwise excluded from the U . S .  labor 
market . t .'" Thus, such programs promote the welfare of not  only 
natives but also al iens.  compared to the politically feasib le  al terna­
tives: we should l iberalize access to these programs by l iberalizing or 
eliminating labor certification requirements,  quotas, and restrictions 
on the duration of guest workers' employmen t  or on their stays in the 
United States. We should also remove restrictions on  the types of 
employment that  these guest workers may take,  so that  al iens are free 
to seek any job i n  the United States,  and al l  sectors of the U . S .  
economy can benefi t from hiring them. Current d iscussions o f  a n  
expanded guest-worker program envision l iberalization beyond the 
agricultural sector , 1 -'h which would represent at  least a step in  the right 
direction . 
The protection of the interests of nat ives does not  require many 
of the restrictions currently imposed on guest workers . 1 -'7 There is no 
need.  for example .  to restrict the al ien's freedom to move from one 
employer to another or from one sector of the economy to another.  
Like immigration restrictions,  restrictions on mobility between j obs 
are economically inefficient as well  as unduly burdensome for the 
worker subj ect to the restriction. Freedom to leave an employer and 
to take employment elsewhere would give workers greater power to 
assert their rights against employers and thus prevent abuses, without 
destroying the gains from trade that natives enj oy from employing 
alien workers. Thus, both Mexico and Democrats in Congress have 
urged that a reformed guest-worker policy include the freedom to 
change employersYs A proposal including at least this reform 
appears likely to emerge from ongoing negotiations between the 
United States and MexicoY') We can also fortify the guest worker's  
incentives to complain about abuses with protections against em-
1 35 .  Sl.'c J U L I ;\ N  L.  S i i\. 10"1 .  THE ECONOivi i C  CON S EOL E N C c S  O F  L\l :vt ! Ci R AT I O N  302�03 . 3 10 
( l LJSLJ ) ( a rguing that  a guest-worker program i s  better than a pol icy of exc lus ion ) :  Chang. supru 
note o 7. at l ! LJ2�LJ4 ( same ) :  sec ulso S e i dman.  supra note 57 .  a l ! 43 ( " Why should anyone 
b e l i e ve that a guest worker is ·e xp lo i ted · when he recei ves  h igher wages a n d  m ore protection i n  
t h e  program than  h e  would rece ive i f  he  remained i n  h i s  home country·) " ) .  
l 3o. Sec Diane  Lindquis t .  Guesl- lmrka Plun OfFers .fohs Be votu! Furms. SA N  D I EG O  
U N I O I\ -T R I B  . . A ug. 1 0. 200 1 .  a t  A2o. 
1 3 7 .  De mocrats in Congress have stressed that guest workers should e nj oy the same rights 
in  the workplace as c i t izens .  See Peterson. supru note 3. at  A l .  
1 38. See Corch ado . supra note 2 .  a t  ! A: Thompson. supra note 3. a t  A 2 .  
1 3LJ. Scc S t e rn . supra note l l 5 . at A l .  
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ployer retaliation for whist leblowers_ or even bount ies  or  other 
rewards for those who make meritorious claims that their  employers 
are violating the rights of employees . 1 -l1 1 
At the same t ime,  we must reduce or  e liminate the protectionist  
barriers that we currently impose on employer sponsorship ,  such as 
labor certification.  These l iberalizing reforms are especia l ly essential  
if we make the employee 's visa more portable .  Employers wi l l  be 
re luctant to invest much t ime or money in  sponsoring a worker's  visa 
if the worker is  then fre e  to l eave to work for a compe ting e mployer 
who can thereby take a fre e  ride on the sponsoring employer's 
investment in the visa.  
We might also al low unski l led guest workers to adj ust  their status 
to permanent residence without i mposing a net burden on  n atives if 
appropriate conditions are met.  Mexico has urged the United S tates 
to al low guest workers to remain permanently,  and a proposal  includ­
ing some sort of  access to permanent residence may yet  emerge from 
negotiations between the two countri es . 1 -l 1  The condit ions for adj ust­
ment of status might includ e ,  for example, a suffic ient ly le ngthy 
period of residence and employment as a guest worker without a 
criminal  record , as wel l  as payment of a sufficient amount in taxes 
over this period . 1 -l2 
In any event,  a guest-worker program would not prod uce a he­
reditary c lass of a l ien residents in  the United States because the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U . S .  Constitution gives U . S .  cit izen­
ship to anyone born in  the U nited States, including t h e  chi ldren of 
nonimmigrants . 1 -� �  Thus,  guest-worker programs in the U ni ted  States 
cannot create the type of caste society that they might in  countries 
that do not provide this birthright citizenship .  Furthermore,  c i t izen­
ship for the chi ldren of immigrants has proven to be consistent  with 
the national economic i nterest.  as the avai lable evidence ind icates 
1 .:10. The AFL-CIO has u rged whist le -blower protections and amnesty for unauthorized 
immtgrants who compla in  about substandard work ing condit ions or o ther  v io l a tions .  See 
Cleelancl.  supra note 1 1 4.  at A I :  Frank Swoboda .  Unions Re verse on Illegal A liens; Pulicv Seeks 
A ll l l l estv,  En d W Sanctions. WAS H .  POST. Feb. 1 7 . 2000. at A I .  
i .:l l .  See Stern. supru note 1 1 5 .  a t  A I .  
l -'12. See Laurie Goering. Bush Considering Green Card " Points " /'vlexicwzs Puying Tax:es 
Cou ld Sru , · .  0-1 ! .  T R I B  . . Aug. 22.  200 1 .  at ! :  Eric  Schmit t .  No A green z e/ 1 1  Yet wirlz Alexin; on 
lnunigmrion Pian, U.S. Says. N . Y .  Ti iv lES. Sept .  l .  20(l l .  at A l .  
1 43.  See U.S .  CONST. amend.  XIV. � l ( "A l l  persons born o r  natura l ized i n  the U ni ted 
S t a tes.  and subj ec t to the j ur isdict ion thereof. are  c it izens of the U n ited Sta tes am! of the  State 
w h e re i n  they reside . " ) .  
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that the descendants of even unskilled immigrants have a pos i t ive  
fiscal impact,  even taking into account the cost  of  publ ic  education . 1 �J 
Once we lift restrictions on the duration of a guest worker's  resi­
dence and employment  in the United States ,  however ,  the program 
raises the prospect of de facto permanent residents with only re­
stricted access to cit izenship . 1 �" Liberal  objections to this prospect 
help explain some of the polit ical resistance to expansion of these 
guest-worker  programs. Woodward obj ects that ' ' [ t )he  creation of a 
class of permanent residents who are restricted from becoming 
citizens ( if  they should wish to do so)  or any similar system of differ­
ent ia l  status among a state ' s  permanent inhabitants i s  fundamental ly 
incompatible with l iberal  egalitarian ideals .  " t �n As Carens and others 
have argued ,  however, the exclusion of aliens is also i ncompatible 
with these ideals . 1 47 I f  polit ical  realit ies require us to choose between 
these two departures from o ur l iberal  egalitarian ideals ,  then how can 
Woodward j ustify the choice that inflicts the greater harm on the 
al ien as well as on  natives? 
I ronically , Woodward himself notes that if we act against a 
' 'background of non-ideal institutions and behaviour" in  a world "in 
which large numbers of people and institutions fai l  to do what j ustice 
requires , ' '  we m ay ' ' acquire obligations which are different from those 
[we] would acquire under more perfectly j ust institutional arrange­
ments .  " 1 �� As Woodward states the theory of the second-best :  
[ t  is  not in general  a defensible moral  pr inc iple that  i f  i t  is  obl iga­
tory (or even a good thing)  to do P under ideal ,  utopian circum­
stances. then i t  is  a lso obl igatory (or even a good thing)  to do P 
under the actual c ircumstances,  no matter how far they may d i ffe r 
from t h e  ideal . 1 �l) 
Goodin notes that ' ' [t) here is much to be  said for the realist  argument 
that insists upon ' ' the importance of not  making a fet ish of moral 
ideals , "  because "doing the best  you can in an imperfect world may 
well  require you to compromise any ( indeed,  a l l )  of your moral 
1 44. See N R C  supra n o t e  6 8 .  at  32SJ ( " [T] h e  present value o f  t h e  descen d a n ts of a curre nt  
tmm igrant . . .  i s  a lways posit ive.  regardless of the i m migrant 's  age a t  arr iva l  and e ducation 
l e v e l . · · )  
1 45.  See Munoz. supra n o t e  1 34. at  M 3 .  
1 46 .  Woodward. supra note 40. a t  8 2 .  
1 4  7. See supru note 38.  
1 48.  Woodward.  supra note 40. a t  78.  
149. /d. a t  77:  see Carens. supra note 1 5 .  at 45 ( " Ideals  do not a l wa ys translate d i rect ly  into 
prescriptions for  practice b ecause of  the second-best problems fa m i l i a r  from economic theory 
which have their  ana logue i n  moral  theory . " ) .  
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ideals" and a " [f] ailure to take due account of the probable reactions 
of others can . . .  have consequences that are truly catastrophic ." 1 51 1  
Woodward advances realist  claims in  defense of immigration re­
strictions,  but as we have seen. they could more plausibly j ustify 
restrict ions on al ien access to public benefits  and to  ci t izenship .  
Indeed.  Woodward himsel f  notes  that  ' ' i t  is  far from obvious that i t  
would be wrong . . .  to l imit  e l igibi l i ty for social  welfare programmes 
to cit izens or long-term residents ,  if  fai lure to do so would jeopardize 
the continued existence of such programmes.  " 1 5 1  We might say the 
same about restrictions on alien access to public benefi ts  and cit izen­
ship if  these restrictions are necessary to make polit ically feasible the 
alien ' s  access to our labor market and the al ien's  admission in the first 
place . 
These second-best arguments require us to rank two non-ideal  
alternatives, both of which fall  short of our moral ide als .  In this  
regard, teleological moral theories have an advantage over deonto­
logical theories .  Under a te leological theory, " those insti tut ions and 
acts are right which of the available al ternatives produce the most 
good.  " 1 52 Once we specify the good.  then a teleological theory can 
provide a complete  ranking of all a l ternatives, including non-ideal  
a lternatives . 1 53 D e ontological theories,  which do  not maximize a good 
specified in advance , 1 5-l may not readily provide a ranking of non- ideal  
alterna tives . ' 55 
We might ,  for example,  specify the good as an appropriate meas­
ure of social welfare , one b ased on the satisfaction of preferences but 
excluding those preferences that  violate our l iberal  principles of 
equality.  Ronald D workin ,  for example ,  has proposed such a teleo­
logical theoryY6 I f  we apply this  type of consequential ism and adopt 
a cosmopolitan perspective , then a guest-worker program represents 
the lesser of two evils when compared with the alternative of exclu­
sion . Exclusion not only decreases global wealth but also worsens its 
1 50.  G ood i n .  sup ra  n o t e  5 lJ .  a t  2 5 5 .  
1 5 1 .  Woodward.  supra n o t e  4 0 .  a t  7 9 .  
1 52 .  RAWLS.  s u p ra  note 1 8. a t  2 4 .  
1 5 3. See RO B I N  B O A DWA Y & N E I L  B R UC E .  W E L FA R E  ECONO,vi i CS 34 ( 1 lJ04 ) ( de fi n i n g  a 
"'complete· ·  orde ring) :  JOHN VON N E U I'vi A N N  & 0 S K A R  M O RG ENSTER�.  T H E O R Y  O F  G A \ I ES 
A N D  ECONOI'vi i C  B E H A V I O R  26 (3d e d . l 95 3 )  (same).  
1 54. See RAWLS.  supra note 1 8. at 30. 
1 5 5 .  See id. at 303 ( sugge st ing t h a t  .. we may be able to find no sat isfactory a n sw e r  at al l  .
. 
i n  
"instances o f  n o n i d e a l  theory " ) .  
1 5 6. See D W O R K I N .  supra n ote 2 1 .  a t  234-30.  I h a v e  outl i n e d  a s i m i l a r  t heory.  w h i c h  I c a l l  
" l i beral  consequential i s m  . .
. 
See C h ang. sup ra n o t e  1 20. a t  1 95-96. 
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d istribution,  whereas a guest-worker program would improve social 
welfare on  both counts .  From this p erspective , l iberal  opposition to 
guest-worker policies is harmfu l  and m isguided,  because the alterna­
t ive of exclusion raises even worse moral problems from the perspec­
tive of our l iberal  principles of equality .  
Exclusion may benefi t  some workers in the country of immigra­
t ion,  but only at  the expense of others in the country of i mm igration 
and a t  the expense of alien workers who are even worse off than the 
beneficiaries of the policy of exclusion. Thus, the employment 
d iscrimination impl ied by a policy of exclusion is difficult  to  j ustify 
from a cosmopolitan perspective because its primary victims are 
poorer than the workers who are privileged by this d iscriminatory 
regime .  From this perspective, redistribution designed  to compensate 
the workers adverse ly affected by i mmigration may itself bring about 
a desirable reduction in  global  inequality or may be n ecessary to 
soften  the political opposit ion to l ibera lized immigration,  but this 
redistribution is not strictly n ecessary for immigration l iberalization 
to  be  an i mprovement over the status quo. In terms of cosmopolitan 
l iberal ideals,  the increase in global welfare and the i mprovement in 
its d istribution created by l iberal ization itself would be sufficient to 
j ustify l ibera lization whether or  not transfers compensate native 
workers for the erosion of the privileged status conferred by restric­
t ionist policies .  
CONCLUSION 
The employment d iscrimination against al iens implied by our 
immigrat ion restrictions is d ifficult  to j ustify, whether we adopt the 
cosmopolitan perspective or  instead embrace less egal itarian l iberal 
idea ls and favor the interests of na tives over those of a l iens .  Consid­
erations of both global economic welfare and n ational  economic 
welfare militate in favor of l iberalized al ien access to  our labor 
markets. In the case of ski l led aliens, the United States can l ift 
restrictions on the employment  of al iens consistent with the national 
interest by l iberalizing access to employment-based immigrant visas 
for ski l led workers. In the case of unskil led al iens,  however, the 
optimal policy from the perspective of the interests of natives departs 
significantly from the policy prescribed by cosmopolitan ideals .  
While the employment discrimination implied by our immigration 
restrictions remains difficult  to j ust ify , some discrimination against 
unskil led al iens in  the distribution of public benefits and in  access to 
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citizenship may serve the interests of n atives. These considerations 
militate in favor of guest-worker programs as policies that provide 
access to our labor markets without necessarily providing ful l  access 
to the transfers provided to citizens .  
While guest-worker programs may be  ideal  from the  perspective 
of the economic welfare of natives, t hey are only second-best  policies 
from the cosmopolitan perspective . The cosmopolitan l iberal would 
prefe r  that aliens have access to both our labor market and ready 
access to public benefits and citizenship .  As a matter of polit ical 
reality. however ,  natives are unl ikely to  admit aliens under  those 
generous conditions in  the numbers that cosmopolitan idea ls would 
require , given the fiscal burden that those liberal p olicies would 
entail .  Given this constraint of polit ical  feasibility, cosmopolitan 
liberals face a trade-off: significantly l iberalized access to our labor 
markets for unskil led alien workers wil l  l ikely require some restric­
tions in access to pub lic benefits and citizenship to h ave a realistic 
chance of enactment .  From a consequentialist perspective that 
extends equal concern to  a l iens and natives,  guest-wor k e r  p rograms 
are less unj ust than the status quo alternative of exclusion .  Reforms 
that reduce employment discrimin ation against aliens should prove 
feasible,  even while eliminating a l l  d iscrimination against aliens 
remains an unrealistic ideal .  Therefore, I have suggested,  cosmopoli­
tan liberals should support libera lizing reforms that include guest­
worker programs , even while seek ing the broadest rights p ossible for 
al iens within the constraints of polit ical  feasibility. While i t  would be 
a mistake to pretend th at  this compromise is ideal from a l iberal 
egalitarian perspective , it would also be a mistake to sacrifice worth­
while reforms because they fal l  short of the ideal .  
